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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Questions about the usage of the vTPM implemented in Xen 4.3
On 02/12/2014 04:38 AM, Jordi Cucurull Juan wrote: Hello Daniel, On 02/11/2014 04:26 PM, Daniel De Graaf wrote:On 02/11/2014 05:01 AM, Jordi Cucurull Juan wrote:Hello Daniel, Thanks for your thorough answer. I have a few comments below. On 02/10/2014 08:40 PM, Daniel De Graaf wrote:On 02/05/2014 11:52 AM, Jordi Cucurull Juan wrote:Dear all, I have recently configured a Xen 4.3 server with the vTPM enabled and a guest virtual machine that takes advantage of it. After playing a bit with it, I have a few questions: 1.According to the documentation, to shutdown the vTPM stubdom it is only needed to normally shutdown the guest VM. Theoretically, the vTPM stubdom automatically shuts down after this. Nevertheless, if I shutdown the guest the vTPM stubdom continues active and, moreover, I can start the machine again and the values of the vTPM are the last ones there were in the previous instance of the guest. Is this normal?The documentation is in error here; while this was originally how the vTPM domain behaved, this automatic shutdown was not reliable: it was not done if the peer domain did not use the vTPM, and it was incorrectly triggered by pv-grub's use of the vTPM to record guest kernel measurements (which was the immediate reason for its removal). The solution now is to either send a shutdown request or simply destroy the vTPM upon guest shutdown. An alternative that may require less work on your part is to destroy the vTPM stub domain during a guest's construction, something like: #!/bin/sh -e xl destroy "$1-vtpm" || true xl create $1-vtpm.cfg xl create $1-domu.cfg Allowing a vTPM to remain active across a guest restart will cause the PCR values extended by pv-grub to be incorrect, as you observed in your second email. In order for the vTPM's PCRs to be useful for quotes or releasing sealed secrets, you need to ensure that a new vTPM is started if and only if it is paired with a corresponding guest.I see a potential threat due to this behaviour (please correct me if I am wrong). Assume an administrator of Dom0 becomes malicious. Since the hypervisor does not enforce the shut down of the vTPM domain, the malicious administrator could try the following: 1) make a copy of the peer domain, 2) manipulate the copy of the peer domain and disable its measurements, 3) boot the original peer domain, 4) switch it off or pause it, 5) boot the manipulated copy of the peer domain. Then, the shown PCR values of the manipulated copy of the peer domain are the ones measured by the original peer domain during the first boot. But the manipulated copy is the one actually running. Hence, this could not be detected nor by quoting the vTPM neither the pTPM.A malicious dom0 has a much simpler attack vector: start the domain with a custom version of pv-grub that extends arbitrary measurements instead of the real kernel's measurements. Then, a user kernel with disabled or similarly false measuring capabilities can be booted. Alternatively, if XSM polices do not restrict it, a debugger could be attached to the guest so that it can be manipulated online.This is the reason why I wanted to measure Dom0, to detect a possible manipulation, e.g. of a custom version of pv-grub. Nevertheless, still the administrator could try to inject a manipulated copy of it into the system after booting it. Hence, I agree with the solutions you propose below.May be, one possible solution could be to enforce an XSM FLASK policy to prevent any user in Dom0 from destroying, shutting down or pausing a domain. Then, measure the policy when Dom0 starts into a PCR of the phsyical TPM. Nevertheless, on one hand I do not know if this is feasible and, in the other hand, this prevents the system from destroying the vTPM domain when the peer domain shuts down.The solution to this problem is to disaggregate dom0 and relocate the domain building component to a stub domain that is completely measured in the pTPM (perhaps by TBOOT). The domain builder could use a static library of domains to build (hardware domain and TPM Manager built only once; vTPM and pv-grub domain pairs built on request). An XSM policy could then restrict vTPM communication so that only correctly built guests are allowed to talk to their paired vTPM. In this case, dom0 would have permission to shut down either VM, but could not start a replacement.I understand this cannot be done with the current implementation of Xen. Are there any plans to do this in the future? Yes, although I am not sure how easy it will be to upstream the changes. The hypervisor changes to make the hardware domain distinct from dom0 are mostly present in 4.4 - it just lacks the hooks to postpone IOMMU setup for the hardware domain instead of dom0. I plan to post these for review once 4.4 is branched. The domain builder needed to run this setup also exists but the version which handles build requests depends on an out-of-tree patch to the hypervisor implementing inter-domain message sending (IVC). Since V4V is more feature-complete than IVC, I think changing our domain builder to use V4V instead of IVC will be necessary for it to be incorporated into Xen. The bootstrapping version of the domain builder (which would be run with domain ID 0) does not depend on IVC, but only builds a single list of domains from its ramdisk. 2.In the documentation it is recommended to avoid accessing the physical TPM from Dom0 at the same time than the vTPM Manager stubdom. Nevertheless, I currently have the IMA and the Trousers enabled in Dom0 without any apparent issue. Why is not recommended directly accessing the physical TPM of Dom0?While most of the time it is not a problem to have two entities talking to the physical TPM, it is possible for the trousers daemon in dom0 to interfere with key handles used by the TPM Manager. There are also certain operations of the TPM that may not handle concurrency, although I do not believe that trousers uses them - SHA1Start, the DAA commands, and certain audit logs come to mind. The other reason why it is recommended to avoid pTPM access from dom0 is because the ability to send unseal/unbind requests to the physical TPM makes it possible for applications running in dom0 to decrypt the TPM Manager's data (and thereby access vTPM private keys). At present, sharing the physical TPM between dom0 and the TPM Manager is the only way to get full integrity checks.OK, I see. Hence leaving the TPM support enabled in Dom0 opens a security problem to the vTPM. But if we do not enable the support, the integrity of Dom0 cannot be proved using the TPM (e.g. by remote attestation).Right. Since dom0 currently must be trusted (as discussed above) this is currently the best way to handle the dom0 attestation problem.3.If it is not recommended to directly accessing the physical TPM in Dom0, which is the advisable way to check the integrity of this domain? With solutions such as TBOOT and IntelTXT?While the TPM Manager in Xen 4.3/4.4 does not yet have this functionality, an update which I will be submitting for inclusion in Xen 4.5 has the ability to get physical TPM quotes using a virtual TPM. Combined with an early domain builder, the eventual goal is to have dom0 use a vTPM for its integrity/reporting/sealing operations, and use the physical TPM only to secure the secrets of vTPMs and for deep quotes to provide fresh proofs of the system's state.This sounds really good. I look forward to try it in Xen 4.5!! Thank you for your answers! Jordi. -- Daniel De Graaf National Security Agency _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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