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[Xen-devel] [xen-4.3-testing test] 24749: regressions - trouble: blocked/broken/fail/pass

flight 24749 xen-4.3-testing real [real]

Regressions :-(

Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
 build-amd64-pvops             3 host-build-prep           fail REGR. vs. 24716

Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel  1 xen-build-check(1)           blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-pv           1 xen-build-check(1)           blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin  1 xen-build-check(1)           blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-xl           1 xen-build-check(1)           blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop                   fail  never pass
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop              fail never pass
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf      1 xen-build-check(1)           blocked  n/a
 test-armhf-armhf-xl           5 xen-boot                     fail   never pass
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3  1 xen-build-check(1)           blocked n/a
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop         fail never pass
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3  1 xen-build-check(1)           blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-pair         1 xen-build-check(1)           blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check        fail never pass
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64  1 xen-build-check(1)         blocked n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64  1 xen-build-check(1)         blocked n/a
 test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check             fail  never pass
 test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop               fail never pass
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop         fail never pass
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop              fail never pass
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64  1 xen-build-check(1)           blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3  1 xen-build-check(1)           blocked n/a

version targeted for testing:
 xen                  d7c6be61836b0a4d996f82d3e7c7e50150996701
baseline version:
 xen                  c450908dc9168c3f20787aab268fcc295feaed7d

People who touched revisions under test:
  Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  Matthew Daley <mattd@xxxxxxxxxxx>

 build-amd64                                                  pass    
 build-armhf                                                  pass    
 build-i386                                                   pass    
 build-amd64-oldkern                                          pass    
 build-i386-oldkern                                           pass    
 build-amd64-pvops                                            broken  
 build-armhf-pvops                                            pass    
 build-i386-pvops                                             pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl                                          blocked 
 test-armhf-armhf-xl                                          fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl                                           pass    
 test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-amd                                 pass    
 test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd                           pass    
 test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd                           pass    
 test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64                              pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64                         blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64                          fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64                         blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64                          fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64                               blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64                                fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-credit2                                   pass    
 test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386                               pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel                              blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-intel                               pass    
 test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel                         pass    
 test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel                         pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-multivcpu                                 pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-pair                                        blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-pair                                         pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin                                 blocked 
 test-amd64-amd64-pv                                          blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-pv                                           pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf                                     blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1                     fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1                     fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1                           fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3                          fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3                           blocked 
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3                           blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3                                fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3                                 blocked 

sg-report-flight on woking.cam.xci-test.com
logs: /home/xc_osstest/logs
images: /home/xc_osstest/images

Logs, config files, etc. are available at

Test harness code can be found at

Not pushing.

commit d7c6be61836b0a4d996f82d3e7c7e50150996701
Author: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Thu Feb 6 17:27:10 2014 +0100

    libvchan: Fix handling of invalid ring buffer indices
    The remote (hostile) process can set ring buffer indices to any value
    at any time. If that happens, it is possible to get "buffer space"
    (either for writing data, or ready for reading) negative or greater
    than buffer size.  This will end up with buffer overflow in the second
    memcpy inside of do_send/do_recv.
    Fix this by introducing new available bytes accessor functions
    raw_get_data_ready and raw_get_buffer_space which are robust against
    mad ring states, and only return sanitised values.
    Proof sketch of correctness:
    Now {rd,wr}_{cons,prod} are only ever used in the raw available bytes
    functions, and in do_send and do_recv.
    The raw available bytes functions do unsigned arithmetic on the
    returned values.  If the result is "negative" or too big it will be
    >ring_size (since we used unsigned arithmetic).  Otherwise the result
    is a positive in-range value representing a reasonable ring state, in
    which case we can safely convert it to int (as the rest of the code
    do_send and do_recv immediately mask the ring index value with the
    ring size.  The result is always going to be plausible.  If the ring
    state has become mad, the worst case is that our behaviour is
    inconsistent with the peer's ring pointer.  I.e. we read or write to
    arguably-incorrect parts of the ring - but always parts of the ring.
    And of course if a peer misoperates the ring they can achieve this
    effect anyway.
    So the security problem is fixed.
    This is XSA-86.
    (The patch is essentially Ian Jackson's work, although parts of the
    commit message are by Marek.)
    Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    master commit: 2efcb0193bf3916c8ce34882e845f5ceb1e511f7
    master date: 2014-02-06 16:44:41 +0100

commit 11b3280cc0ce64b375492416a23aa6a15f45a796
Author: Matthew Daley <mattd@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Thu Feb 6 17:25:43 2014 +0100

    xsm/flask: correct off-by-one in flask_security_avc_cachestats cpu id check
    This is XSA-85.
    Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@xxxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
    master commit: 2e1cba2da4631c5cd7218a8f30d521dce0f41370
    master date: 2014-02-06 16:42:36 +0100

commit e9c5e56b4c17fd1ce28577df23cc53cc62c0d792
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Thu Feb 6 17:21:16 2014 +0100

    flask: fix reading strings from guest memory
    Since the string size is being specified by the guest, we must range
    check it properly before doing allocations based on it. While for the
    two cases that are exposed only to trusted guests (via policy
    restriction) this just uses an arbitrary upper limit (PAGE_SIZE), for
    the FLASK_[GS]ETBOOL case (which any guest can use) the upper limit
    gets enforced based on the longest name across all boolean settings.
    This is XSA-84.
    Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@xxxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    master commit: 6c79e0ab9ac6042e60434c02e1d99b0cf0cc3470
    master date: 2014-02-06 16:33:50 +0100
(qemu changes not included)

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