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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] xen: arm: do not BUG on guest paddrs which are very high





On 12/09/2013 11:09 AM, Ian Campbell wrote:
The BUG_ON in p2m_map_first was over aggressive since the paddr_t can have
come from the guest, via add_to_physmap. Instead return failure to the caller.

Also the check was simultaneously too lose. The valid offsets are
0..P2M_FIRST_ENTRIES-1 inclusive.

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
v2: Don't access uninitialised pte on the error path
---
  xen/arch/arm/p2m.c |   11 ++++++++++-
  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
index 1d5c841..083f8bf 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ static lpae_t *p2m_map_first(struct p2m_domain *p2m, paddr_t 
addr)
  {
      struct page_info *page;

-    BUG_ON(first_linear_offset(addr) > P2M_FIRST_ENTRIES);
+    if ( first_linear_offset(addr) >= P2M_FIRST_ENTRIES )
+        return NULL;

      page = p2m->first_level + p2m_first_level_index(addr);

@@ -80,6 +81,8 @@ paddr_t p2m_lookup(struct domain *d, paddr_t paddr)
      spin_lock(&p2m->lock);

      first = p2m_map_first(p2m, paddr);
+    if ( !first )
+        goto err;

      pte = first[first_table_offset(paddr)];
      if ( !pte.p2m.valid || !pte.p2m.table )
@@ -105,6 +108,7 @@ done:
      if (second) unmap_domain_page(second);
      if (first) unmap_domain_page(first);

+err:
      spin_unlock(&p2m->lock);

      return maddr;
@@ -181,6 +185,11 @@ static int create_p2m_entries(struct domain *d,
          {
              if ( first ) unmap_domain_page(first);
              first = p2m_map_first(p2m, addr);
+            if ( !first )
+            {
+                rc = -EINVAL;
+                goto out;
+            }
              cur_first_page = p2m_first_level_index(addr);
          }



--
Julien Grall

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