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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] common/kexec: Prevent deadlock on reentry to the crash path.
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On 15/11/13 20:32, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> In some cases, such as suffering a queued-invalidation timeout while
> performing an iommu_crash_shutdown(), Xen can end up reentering the crash
> path. Previously, this would result in a deadlock in one_cpu_only(), as the
> test_and_set_bit() would fail.
>
> The crash path is not reentrant, and even if it could be made to be so, it is
> almost certain that we would fall over the same reentry condition again.
>
> The new code can distinguish a reentry case from multiple cpus racing down the
> crash path. In the case that a reentry is detected, return back out to the
> nested panic() call, which will maybe_reboot() on our behalf. This requires a
> bit of return plumbing back up to kexec_crash().
>
> While fixing this deadlock, also fix up an minor niggle seen recently from a
> XenServer crash report. The report was from a Bank 8 MCE, which had managed
> to crash on all cpus at once. The result was a lot of stack traces with cpus
> in kexec_common_shutdown(), which was infact the inlined version of
> one_cpu_only(). The kexec crash path is not a hotpath, so we can easily
> afford to prevent inlining for the sake of clarity in the stack traces.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
> CC: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> xen/common/kexec.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/common/kexec.c b/xen/common/kexec.c
> index 17f3ed7..481b0c2 100644
> --- a/xen/common/kexec.c
> +++ b/xen/common/kexec.c
> @@ -233,11 +233,39 @@ void __init set_kexec_crash_area_size(u64 system_ram)
> }
> }
>
> -static void one_cpu_only(void)
> +/*
> + * Only allow one cpu to continue on the crash path, forcing others to spin.
> + * Racing on the crash path from here will end in misery. If we reenter,
> + * something has very gone wrong and retrying will (almost certainly) be
> + * futile. Return up to our nested panic() to try and reboot.
> + *
> + * This is noinline to make it obvious in stack traces which cpus have lost
> + * the race (as opposed to being somewhere in kexec_common_shutdown())
> + */
> +static int noinline one_cpu_only(void)
> {
> - /* Only allow the first cpu to continue - force other cpus to spin */
> - if ( test_and_set_bit(KEXEC_FLAG_IN_PROGRESS, &kexec_flags) )
> - for ( ; ; ) ;
> + static unsigned int crashing_cpu = -1;
> + unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
> +
> + if ( cmpxchg(&crashing_cpu, -1, cpu) != -1 )
> + {
> + /* Not the first entry into one_cpu_only(). */
> + if ( crashing_cpu == cpu )
> + {
> + printk("Reentered the crash path. Something is very broken\n");
> + return -EBUSY;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Another cpu has beaten us to this point. Wait here patiently for
> + * it to kill us.
> + */
> + for ( ; ; )
> + halt();
> + }
> +
> + set_bit(KEXEC_FLAG_IN_PROGRESS, &kexec_flags);
> + return 0;
> }
>
> /* Save the registers in the per-cpu crash note buffer. */
> @@ -288,13 +316,20 @@ crash_xen_info_t *kexec_crash_save_info(void)
> return out;
> }
>
> -static void kexec_common_shutdown(void)
> +static int kexec_common_shutdown(void)
> {
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = one_cpu_only();
> + if ( ret )
> + return ret;
> +
> watchdog_disable();
> console_start_sync();
> spin_debug_disable();
> - one_cpu_only();
> acpi_dmar_reinstate();
> +
> + return 0;
> }
>
> void kexec_crash(void)
> @@ -309,7 +344,9 @@ void kexec_crash(void)
>
> kexecing = TRUE;
>
> - kexec_common_shutdown();
> + if ( kexec_common_shutdown() != 0 )
> + return;
> +
> kexec_crash_save_cpu();
> machine_crash_shutdown();
> machine_kexec(kexec_image[KEXEC_IMAGE_CRASH_BASE + pos]);
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