[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] VMX: don't crash processing 'd' debug key
At 16:09 +0000 on 08 Nov (1383923399), Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 08/11/13 16:04, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>>> On 07.11.13 at 20:08, Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> wrote: > >> At 10:44 +0000 on 07 Nov (1383817496), Jan Beulich wrote: > >>> @@ -675,7 +675,17 @@ void vmx_get_segment_register(struct vcp > >>> { > >>> unsigned long attr = 0, sel = 0, limit; > >>> > >>> - vmx_vmcs_enter(v); > >>> + /* > >>> + * We may get here in the context of dump_execstate(), which may have > >>> + * interrupted context switching between setting "current" and > >>> + * vmx_do_resume() reaching the end of vmx_load_vmcs(). That would > >>> make > >>> + * all the VMREADs below fail if we don't bail right away. > >>> + */ > >>> + if ( unlikely(!vmx_vmcs_enter(v)) ) > >>> + { > >>> + memset(reg, 0, sizeof(*reg)); > >>> + return; > >> It would be nice to print something here, at least on the first > >> instance. Otherwise someone looking at bizarre debugkey output would > >> have to know (and remember) about this path. > > Did this. > > > >> I'd also be inclined to ASSERT that, e.g. interrupts are disabled here > >> -- if for any reason this function ever starts corrupting register > >> state on other paths, we'll want to know about it quickly! > > But I'm rather hesitant to do this. If anything, we'd need per-CPU > > state tracking whether we're in do_invalid_op()'s main switch. > > > > Jan > > > > I agree - the debug keys are hardly normal operation, and we don't want > to ASSERT() in a debugkey. But this code is also (and mode commonly) called from non-debugkey paths, which are what the ASSERT would be guarding. An alternative would be to plumb a 'tolerate failure' flag down the stack and use that only from the debugkey handler. That kind of protection might be nice for vmx_vmcs_enter() too: make it into vmx_vmcs_enter_try() and have vmx_vmcs_enter() be a wrapper taht ASSERT()s success. Tim. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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