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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/3 V3] XSA-60 security hole: cr0.cd handling



>>> On 24.10.13 at 18:39, "Liu, Jinsong" <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Liu, Jinsong wrote:
>> Maybe Jun's concern is 'guest PAT (real pat of vmcs which take
>> effect, not nominal guest_pat) should be identical among all physical
>> processors which run vcpus of that guest', am I right, Jun?  
>> 
>> One thing I'm not sure is, per Intel SDM (8.7.4 of volume 3), the PAT
>> MSR settings must be the same for all processors in a system.
>> However, Xen obviously doesn't satisfy this requirement: PAT of the
>> cpus running vmm context (50100070406) is not identical to PAT of the
>> cpus running guest context (take rhel6.4 guest as example, it's
>> 7010600070106) -- practically it works fine.
> 
> Or, PAT requirement under virtualization would better be 'PAT MSR settings 
> must be the same for all processors of a domain (take vmm as a special 
> domain)'? otherwise IA32_PAT fields of vmcs is pointless.
> 
> Anyway, we'd better change our patch from per-vcpu PAT emulation to 
> per-domain 
> PAT emulation. Does it make sense, Jun?

I don't think that's be in line with what we currently do, or with how
real hardware works. Unless inconsistencies between PAT settings
can be leveraged to affect the hypervisor or other guests, we
should allow the guest to have them inconsistent (as would be the
natural thing transiently when switching to a new value on all CPUs).
And if inconsistencies can have effects outside the VM, then afaict
we have this issue already without this patch.

While mentally going through this logic again I noticed, however,
that the cache flushing your patch is doing is still insufficient: Doing
this just when CD gets set and in the context switch path is not
enough. This needs to be done prior to each VM entry, unless it
can be proven that the hypervisor (or the service domain) didn't
touch guest memory.

Jan


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