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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/3] XSA-60 security hole: remove the problematic vmx_set_uc_mode logic
From 2a0dc13d14d63af67d12f181655dcc04783da83a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 04:45:11 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] XSA-60 security hole: remove the problematic
vmx_set_uc_mode logic
XSA-60 security hole comes from the problematic vmx_set_uc_mode.
This patch remove vmx_set_uc_mode logic, which will be replaced by
PAT approach at later patch.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 2 -
xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c | 3 -
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 9 ---
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c | 120 -----------------------------------------
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 1 -
5 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index de81e45..688a943 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -1619,8 +1619,6 @@ static void hvm_set_uc_mode(struct vcpu *v, bool_t
is_in_uc_mode)
{
v->domain->arch.hvm_domain.is_in_uc_mode = is_in_uc_mode;
shadow_blow_tables_per_domain(v->domain);
- if ( hvm_funcs.set_uc_mode )
- return hvm_funcs.set_uc_mode(v);
}
int hvm_mov_to_cr(unsigned int cr, unsigned int gpr)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
index ef51a8d..4ff1e55 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
@@ -696,9 +696,6 @@ uint8_t epte_get_entry_emt(struct domain *d, unsigned long
gfn, mfn_t mfn,
if ( !v->domain->arch.hvm_domain.params[HVM_PARAM_IDENT_PT] )
return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
- if ( (v == current) && v->domain->arch.hvm_domain.is_in_uc_mode )
- return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
-
if ( !mfn_valid(mfn_x(mfn)) )
return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index b59bf59..6dedb29 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1392,14 +1392,6 @@ static int vmx_event_pending(struct vcpu *v)
return intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
}
-static void vmx_set_uc_mode(struct vcpu *v)
-{
- if ( paging_mode_hap(v->domain) )
- ept_change_entry_emt_with_range(
- v->domain, 0, p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain)->max_mapped_pfn);
- hvm_asid_flush_vcpu(v);
-}
-
static void vmx_set_info_guest(struct vcpu *v)
{
unsigned long intr_shadow;
@@ -1558,7 +1550,6 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __initdata
vmx_function_table = {
.msr_read_intercept = vmx_msr_read_intercept,
.msr_write_intercept = vmx_msr_write_intercept,
.invlpg_intercept = vmx_invlpg_intercept,
- .set_uc_mode = vmx_set_uc_mode,
.set_info_guest = vmx_set_info_guest,
.set_rdtsc_exiting = vmx_set_rdtsc_exiting,
.nhvm_vcpu_initialise = nvmx_vcpu_initialise,
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
index 595c6e7..92d9e2d 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
@@ -587,44 +587,6 @@ out:
return mfn;
}
-/* WARNING: Only caller doesn't care about PoD pages. So this function will
- * always return 0 for PoD pages, not populate them. If that becomes
necessary,
- * pass a p2m_query_t type along to distinguish. */
-static ept_entry_t ept_get_entry_content(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
- unsigned long gfn, int *level)
-{
- ept_entry_t *table =
map_domain_page(pagetable_get_pfn(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m)));
- unsigned long gfn_remainder = gfn;
- ept_entry_t *ept_entry;
- ept_entry_t content = { .epte = 0 };
- u32 index;
- int i;
- int ret=0;
- struct ept_data *ept = &p2m->ept;
-
- /* This pfn is higher than the highest the p2m map currently holds */
- if ( gfn > p2m->max_mapped_pfn )
- goto out;
-
- for ( i = ept_get_wl(ept); i > 0; i-- )
- {
- ret = ept_next_level(p2m, 1, &table, &gfn_remainder, i);
- if ( !ret || ret == GUEST_TABLE_POD_PAGE )
- goto out;
- else if ( ret == GUEST_TABLE_SUPER_PAGE )
- break;
- }
-
- index = gfn_remainder >> (i * EPT_TABLE_ORDER);
- ept_entry = table + index;
- content = *ept_entry;
- *level = i;
-
- out:
- unmap_domain_page(table);
- return content;
-}
-
void ept_walk_table(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn)
{
struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
@@ -677,88 +639,6 @@ out:
}
/*
- * To test if the new emt type is the same with old,
- * return 1 to not to reset ept entry.
- */
-static int need_modify_ept_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn,
- mfn_t mfn, uint8_t o_ipat, uint8_t o_emt,
- p2m_type_t p2mt)
-{
- uint8_t ipat;
- uint8_t emt;
- bool_t direct_mmio = (p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct);
-
- emt = epte_get_entry_emt(p2m->domain, gfn, mfn, &ipat, direct_mmio);
-
- if ( (emt == o_emt) && (ipat == o_ipat) )
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-void ept_change_entry_emt_with_range(struct domain *d,
- unsigned long start_gfn,
- unsigned long end_gfn)
-{
- unsigned long gfn;
- ept_entry_t e;
- mfn_t mfn;
- int order = 0;
- struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
- int rc;
-
- p2m_lock(p2m);
- for ( gfn = start_gfn; gfn <= end_gfn; gfn++ )
- {
- int level = 0;
- uint64_t trunk = 0;
-
- e = ept_get_entry_content(p2m, gfn, &level);
- if ( !is_epte_present(&e) || !p2m_has_emt(e.sa_p2mt) )
- continue;
-
- order = 0;
- mfn = _mfn(e.mfn);
-
- if ( is_epte_superpage(&e) )
- {
- while ( level )
- {
- trunk = (1UL << (level * EPT_TABLE_ORDER)) - 1;
- if ( !(gfn & trunk) && (gfn + trunk <= end_gfn) )
- {
- /* gfn assigned with 2M or 1G, and the end covers more than
- * the super page areas.
- * Set emt for super page.
- */
- order = level * EPT_TABLE_ORDER;
- if ( need_modify_ept_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn,
- e.ipat, e.emt, e.sa_p2mt) )
- {
- rc = ept_set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn, order,
- e.sa_p2mt, e.access);
- ASSERT(rc);
- }
- gfn += trunk;
- break;
- }
- level--;
- }
- }
- else /* gfn assigned with 4k */
- {
- if ( need_modify_ept_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn,
- e.ipat, e.emt, e.sa_p2mt) )
- {
- rc = ept_set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn, order, e.sa_p2mt, e.access);
- ASSERT(rc);
- }
- }
- }
- p2m_unlock(p2m);
-}
-
-/*
* Walk the whole p2m table, changing any entries of the old type
* to the new type. This is used in hardware-assisted paging to
* quickly enable or diable log-dirty tracking
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
index 3376418..8dd2b40 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -156,7 +156,6 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
int (*msr_read_intercept)(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content);
int (*msr_write_intercept)(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content);
void (*invlpg_intercept)(unsigned long vaddr);
- void (*set_uc_mode)(struct vcpu *v);
void (*set_info_guest)(struct vcpu *v);
void (*set_rdtsc_exiting)(struct vcpu *v, bool_t);
--
1.7.1
Attachment:
0002-XSA-60-security-hole-remove-the-problematic-vmx_set_.patch _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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