[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC v13 06/20] pvh: vmx-specific changes
At 17:06 +0100 on 07 Oct (1381165615), George Dunlap wrote: > On 07/10/13 16:55, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > >On 23/09/13 18:49, George Dunlap wrote: > >>@@ -1028,12 +1129,28 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v) > >> | (1U << TRAP_no_device); > >> vmx_update_exception_bitmap(v); > >> > >>+ /* In HVM domains, this happens on the realmode->paging > >>+ * transition. Since PVH never goes through this transition, we > >>+ * need to do it at start-of-day. */ > >>+ if ( is_pvh_domain(d) ) > >>+ vmx_update_debug_state(v); > >>+ > >> v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0] = X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_ET; > >>+ > >>+ /* PVH domains always start in paging mode */ > >>+ if ( is_pvh_domain(d) ) > >>+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0] |= X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_NE | > >>X86_CR0_WP; > >>+ > >> hvm_update_guest_cr(v, 0); > >> > >>- v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] = 0; > >>+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] = is_pvh_domain(d) ? > >>+ real_cr4_to_pv_guest_cr4(mmu_cr4_features) > >Here we need to mask the bits in CR4 that the guest isn't allowed to > >set. Right now Xen is setting the VMXE bit by default, which the guest > >is not able to modify, so if the guests tries to update CR4 based on the > >previous value Xen is going to complain: > > > >+ real_cr4_to_pv_guest_cr4(mmu_cr4_features) & > >+ ~HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(v) > > Thanks for testing that -- I'll include it in the next spin-up. <harping on> This is the sort of thing that would be easier if PVH guests were just HVM ones with extra hypercalls. <harping off> Tim. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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