[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] libxl: set permissions for xs frontend entry pointing to xs backend
Roger Pau Monne writes ("[PATCH] libxl: set permissions for xs frontend entry pointing to xs backend"): > libxl doesn't currently set the permissions of entries like: > > /local/domain/<domid>/device/<dev_type>/<devid>/backend > > This allows the guest to change this xenstore entries to point to a > different backend path, or to malicious xenstore path forged by the > guest itself. libxl currently relies on this path being valid in order > to perform the unplug of devices in libxl__devices_destroy, so we > should prevent the guest from modifying this xenstore entry. Is it sufficient to set the permissions on "backend" - does that prevent the guest deleting the whole subtree ? Really it would be better to make the unplug not depend on this path. This is a security issue, so CCing security@. It appears to have been discovered in public on xen-devel, so shouldn't be embargoed. Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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