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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [V2 PATCH 2/4] PVH xen tools: libxc changes to build a PVH guest.
On Fri, 2013-09-06 at 17:28 -0700, Mukesh Rathor wrote:
> V2: Make pvh_features string const, and fail 32bit PVH guest creation.
> Move PVH check to xc_dom_gnttab_init().
Please put these intra-version changelogs after the S-o-b and a "---"
tag on a line by itself.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> tools/libxc/xc_dom.h | 1 +
> tools/libxc/xc_dom_boot.c | 4 ++
> tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c | 9 ++++
> tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
> index 86e23ee..5168bcd 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
> @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ struct xc_dom_image {
> domid_t console_domid;
> domid_t xenstore_domid;
> xen_pfn_t shared_info_mfn;
> + int pvh_enabled;
>
> xc_interface *xch;
> domid_t guest_domid;
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_boot.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_boot.c
> index d4d57b4..73032a1 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_boot.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_boot.c
> @@ -416,6 +416,10 @@ int xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t
> domid,
>
> int xc_dom_gnttab_init(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
> {
> + /* PVH sets up its own grant during boot via hvm mechanisms */
Last time I saw this I took this to mean that it uses the HVM init
mechanisms in the toolstack, but from the context below I now see this
isn't correct and it actually defers this entirely to the guest.
Why isn't it ok to call something similar to xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed
here? That functionality is there to support disaggregated xenstored by
allowing us to preseed grant entries for the xenstore domain to access
the domains xenstore ring. Likewise for the console ring.
It's failure to do this which necessitates your fourth patch, but even
with that patch xenstore dmains will be broken.
Note that this code fills in grant table entries but does not leave them
mapped for the guest to access (it maps them temporarily and then
unmaps), so calling xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed is not contrary to allowing
the guest to setup its own grant during boot.
> + if ( dom->pvh_enabled )
> + return 0;
> +
> if ( xc_dom_feature_translated(dom) ) {
> return xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed(dom->xch, dom->guest_domid,
> dom->console_pfn, dom->xenstore_pfn,
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
> index 0f367f6..faa7e0f 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
> @@ -766,6 +766,15 @@ int xc_dom_parse_image(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
> goto err;
> }
>
> + if ( dom->pvh_enabled )
> + {
> + const char *pvh_features = "writable_descriptor_tables|"
> + "auto_translated_physmap|"
> + "supervisor_mode_kernel|"
> + "hvm_callback_vector";
> + elf_xen_parse_features(pvh_features, dom->f_requested, NULL);
> + }
> +
> /* check features */
> for ( i = 0; i < XENFEAT_NR_SUBMAPS; i++ )
> {
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
> index 126c0f8..fcc9d87 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
> @@ -415,7 +415,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
> pgpfn = (addr - dom->parms.virt_base) >> PAGE_SHIFT_X86;
> l1tab[l1off] =
> pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, pgpfn)) | L1_PROT;
> - if ( (addr >= dom->pgtables_seg.vstart) &&
> + if ( (!dom->pvh_enabled) &&
> + (addr >= dom->pgtables_seg.vstart) &&
> (addr < dom->pgtables_seg.vend) )
> l1tab[l1off] &= ~_PAGE_RW; /* page tables are r/o */
> if ( l1off == (L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES_X86_64 - 1) )
> @@ -587,6 +588,13 @@ static int vcpu_x86_32(struct xc_dom_image *dom, void
> *ptr)
>
> DOMPRINTF_CALLED(dom->xch);
>
> + if ( dom->pvh_enabled )
> + {
> + xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
> + "%s: PVH not supported for 32bit guests.",
> __FUNCTION__);
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> /* clear everything */
> memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
>
> @@ -629,12 +637,6 @@ static int vcpu_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom, void
> *ptr)
> /* clear everything */
> memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
>
> - ctxt->user_regs.ds = FLAT_KERNEL_DS_X86_64;
> - ctxt->user_regs.es = FLAT_KERNEL_DS_X86_64;
> - ctxt->user_regs.fs = FLAT_KERNEL_DS_X86_64;
> - ctxt->user_regs.gs = FLAT_KERNEL_DS_X86_64;
> - ctxt->user_regs.ss = FLAT_KERNEL_SS_X86_64;
> - ctxt->user_regs.cs = FLAT_KERNEL_CS_X86_64;
> ctxt->user_regs.rip = dom->parms.virt_entry;
> ctxt->user_regs.rsp =
> dom->parms.virt_base + (dom->bootstack_pfn + 1) * PAGE_SIZE_X86;
> @@ -642,15 +644,25 @@ static int vcpu_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom, void
> *ptr)
> dom->parms.virt_base + (dom->start_info_pfn) * PAGE_SIZE_X86;
> ctxt->user_regs.rflags = 1 << 9; /* Interrupt Enable */
>
> - ctxt->kernel_ss = ctxt->user_regs.ss;
> - ctxt->kernel_sp = ctxt->user_regs.esp;
> -
> ctxt->flags = VGCF_in_kernel_X86_64 | VGCF_online_X86_64;
> cr3_pfn = xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, dom->pgtables_seg.pfn);
> ctxt->ctrlreg[3] = xen_pfn_to_cr3_x86_64(cr3_pfn);
> DOMPRINTF("%s: cr3: pfn 0x%" PRIpfn " mfn 0x%" PRIpfn "",
> __FUNCTION__, dom->pgtables_seg.pfn, cr3_pfn);
>
> + if ( dom->pvh_enabled )
> + return 0;
> +
> + ctxt->user_regs.ds = FLAT_KERNEL_DS_X86_64;
> + ctxt->user_regs.es = FLAT_KERNEL_DS_X86_64;
> + ctxt->user_regs.fs = FLAT_KERNEL_DS_X86_64;
> + ctxt->user_regs.gs = FLAT_KERNEL_DS_X86_64;
> + ctxt->user_regs.ss = FLAT_KERNEL_SS_X86_64;
> + ctxt->user_regs.cs = FLAT_KERNEL_CS_X86_64;
> +
> + ctxt->kernel_ss = ctxt->user_regs.ss;
> + ctxt->kernel_sp = ctxt->user_regs.esp;
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -751,7 +763,7 @@ int arch_setup_meminit(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
> rc = x86_compat(dom->xch, dom->guest_domid, dom->guest_type);
> if ( rc )
> return rc;
> - if ( xc_dom_feature_translated(dom) )
> + if ( xc_dom_feature_translated(dom) && !dom->pvh_enabled )
> {
> dom->shadow_enabled = 1;
> rc = x86_shadow(dom->xch, dom->guest_domid);
> @@ -827,6 +839,38 @@ int arch_setup_bootearly(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Map grant table frames into guest physmap. PVH manages grant during boot
> + * via HVM mechanisms.
> + */
> +static int map_grant_table_frames(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
> +{
> + int i, rc;
> +
> + if ( dom->pvh_enabled )
> + return 0;
> +
> + for ( i = 0; ; i++ )
> + {
> + rc = xc_domain_add_to_physmap(dom->xch, dom->guest_domid,
> + XENMAPSPACE_grant_table,
> + i, dom->total_pages + i);
> + if ( rc != 0 )
> + {
> + if ( (i > 0) && (errno == EINVAL) )
> + {
> + DOMPRINTF("%s: %d grant tables mapped", __FUNCTION__, i);
> + break;
> + }
> + xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
> + "%s: mapping grant tables failed " "(pfn=0x%" PRIpfn
> + ", rc=%d)", __FUNCTION__, dom->total_pages + i, rc);
> + return rc;
> + }
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> int arch_setup_bootlate(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
> {
> static const struct {
> @@ -865,7 +909,6 @@ int arch_setup_bootlate(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
> else
> {
> /* paravirtualized guest with auto-translation */
> - int i;
>
> /* Map shared info frame into guest physmap. */
> rc = xc_domain_add_to_physmap(dom->xch, dom->guest_domid,
> @@ -879,25 +922,10 @@ int arch_setup_bootlate(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
> return rc;
> }
>
> - /* Map grant table frames into guest physmap. */
> - for ( i = 0; ; i++ )
> - {
> - rc = xc_domain_add_to_physmap(dom->xch, dom->guest_domid,
> - XENMAPSPACE_grant_table,
> - i, dom->total_pages + i);
> - if ( rc != 0 )
> - {
> - if ( (i > 0) && (errno == EINVAL) )
> - {
> - DOMPRINTF("%s: %d grant tables mapped", __FUNCTION__, i);
> - break;
> - }
> - xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
> - "%s: mapping grant tables failed " "(pfn=0x%"
> - PRIpfn ", rc=%d)", __FUNCTION__,
> dom->total_pages + i, rc);
> - return rc;
> - }
> - }
> + rc = map_grant_table_frames(dom);
> + if ( rc != 0 )
> + return rc;
> +
> shinfo = dom->shared_info_pfn;
> }
>
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