Re: [Xen-devel] HVM support for e820_host (Was: Bug: Limitation of <=2GB RAM in domU persists with 4.3.0)

[Gordan Bobic <gordan@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Here is a test patch I applied to:
/tools/firmware/hvmloader/e820.c

===
--- e820.c.orig 2013-09-06 11:15:20.023337321 +0100
+++ e820.c      2013-09-06 19:53:00.141876019 +0100
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
     unsigned int nr = 0;
     struct xen_memory_map op;
     struct e820entry map[E820MAX];
+    int e820_host = 0;
     int rc;

     if ( !lowmem_reserved_base )
@@ -88,6 +89,7 @@

     rc = hypercall_memory_op ( XENMEM_memory_map, &op);
     if ( rc != -ENOSYS) { /* It works!? */
+        e820_host = 1;
         printf("%s:%d got %d op.nr_entries \n", __func__, __LINE__, 
op.nr_entries);
         dump_e820_table(&map[0], op.nr_entries);
     }
@@ -133,7 +135,12 @@
     /* Low RAM goes here. Reserve space for special pages. */
     BUG_ON((hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT) < (2u << 20));
     e820[nr].addr = 0x100000;
-    e820[nr].size = (hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT) - 
e820[nr].addr;
+
+    if (e820_host)
+        e820[nr].size = 0x3f7e0000 - e820[nr].addr;
+    else
+        e820[nr].size = (hvm_info->low_mem_pgend << PAGE_SHIFT) - 
e820[nr].addr;
+
     e820[nr].type = E820_RAM;
     nr++;

===

I'm sure this doesn't need explicitly pointing out, but for the record, 
it is a gross hack just to prove the concept.
The map dump with this patch applied and memory set to 8192 is:

===
(XEN) HVM5: BIOS map:
(XEN) HVM5:  f0000-fffff: Main BIOS
(XEN) HVM5: build_e820_table:93 got 8 op.nr_entries
(XEN) HVM5: E820 table:
(XEN) HVM5:  [00]: 00000000:00000000 - 00000000:3f790000: RAM
(XEN) HVM5:  [01]: 00000000:3f790000 - 00000000:3f79e000: ACPI
(XEN) HVM5:  [02]: 00000000:3f79e000 - 00000000:3f7d0000: NVS
(XEN) HVM5:  [03]: 00000000:3f7d0000 - 00000000:3f7e0000: RESERVED
(XEN) HVM5:  HOLE: 00000000:3f7e0000 - 00000000:3f7e7000
(XEN) HVM5:  [04]: 00000000:3f7e7000 - 00000000:40000000: RESERVED
(XEN) HVM5:  HOLE: 00000000:40000000 - 00000000:fee00000
(XEN) HVM5:  [05]: 00000000:fee00000 - 00000000:fee01000: RESERVED
(XEN) HVM5:  HOLE: 00000000:fee01000 - 00000000:ffc00000
(XEN) HVM5:  [06]: 00000000:ffc00000 - 00000001:00000000: RESERVED
(XEN) HVM5:  [07]: 00000001:00000000 - 00000002:c0870000: RAM
(XEN) HVM5: E820 table:
(XEN) HVM5:  [00]: 00000000:00000000 - 00000000:0009e000: RAM
(XEN) HVM5:  [01]: 00000000:0009e000 - 00000000:000a0000: RESERVED
(XEN) HVM5:  HOLE: 00000000:000a0000 - 00000000:000e0000
(XEN) HVM5:  [02]: 00000000:000e0000 - 00000000:00100000: RESERVED
(XEN) HVM5:  [03]: 00000000:00100000 - 00000000:3f7e0000: RAM
(XEN) HVM5:  HOLE: 00000000:3f7e0000 - 00000000:fc000000
(XEN) HVM5:  [04]: 00000000:fc000000 - 00000001:00000000: RESERVED
(XEN) HVM5:  [05]: 00000001:00000000 - 00000002:1f800000: RAM
(XEN) HVM5: Invoking ROMBIOS ...
===

Good observations:
It works! No crashes, no screen corruption! As an added bonus, it fixes 
the problem of rebooting domUs causing them to lose GPU access and 
eventually crash the host even with memory allocation below the first 
PCI MMIO block. I am suspecting that something in the 
0x3f7e0000-0x3f7e7000 hole that isn't showing up on lspci might be 
responsible.
I think that proves beyond any doubt what the problem was before.

Interesting observations:
1) GPU PCI MMIO is still mapped at E0000000, rather than at the bottom 
of the memory hole. That implies that SeaBIOS (or whatever does the 
mapping) makes assumptions about where the memory hole begins. This will 
need to somehow be fixed / made dynamic. What decides where to map PCI 
memory for each device?
2) The memory hole size difference counts toward the total guest memory. 
I set
memory=8192
maxmem=8192
but Windows in domU only sees 5.48GB. What is particularly odd is that 
that the missing memory isn't 3GB, but 2.5GB - which implies that, 
again, there are other things making assumptions about the size and 
shape of the memory hole and moving the memory from the hole elsewhere 
to make it usable. What does this?
My todo list, in order of priority (unless somebody here has a better 
idea) is:
1) Tidy up the hole enlargement to make it dynamically based on the host 
hole locations. In cases where the host hole overlaps something other 
than guest RAM/HOLE (i.e. RESERVED), guest spec wins.
2) Fix whatever is causing the hole memory increase to reduce the guest 
memory. The memory hole is a hole, not a shadow. I need some pointers on 
where to look for whatever is responsible for this.
3) Fix what makes decisions on where to map devices' memory apertures. 
Ideally, the fix should be to detect host's pBAR make vBAR=pBAR. Again, 
I need some pointers on where to look for whatever is responsible for 
doing this mapping.
Gordan

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