[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/1 V4] x86/AMD: Fix nested svm crash due to assertion in __virt_to_maddr
On 29.07.13 22:04, Tim Deegan wrote: > At 11:27 -0500 on 29 Jul (1375097276), Suravee Suthikulanit wrote: >> On 7/29/2013 5:43 AM, Tim Deegan wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> At 16:46 -0500 on 26 Jul (1374857167), suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx wrote: >>>> From: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx> >>>> >>>> Fix assertion in __virt_to_maddr when starting nested SVM guest >>>> in debug mode. Investigation has shown that svm_vmsave/svm_vmload >>>> make use of __pa() with invalid address. >>>> >>>> Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx> >>> This looks much better, but I have a few comments still: >>> >>>> +static struct page_info * >>>> +_get_vmcb_page(struct domain *d, uint64_t vmcbaddr) >>> Can you give this a name that makes it clearer that it's for nested >>> VMCBs and not part of the handling of 'real' VMCBs? Also, please drop >>> the leading underscore. >> What about "get_nvmcb_page"? > > Yes, that would be good. > >>> >>>> + { >>>> + gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, >>>> + "VMLOAD: mapping vmcb L1-GPA to MPA failed, injecting >>>> #UD\n"); >>>> + ret = TRAP_invalid_op; >>> The documentation for VMLOAD suggests TRAP_gp_fault for this case. >> OK, I have also checked other exceptions injected in >> svm_vmexit_do_vmsave and svm_vm_exit_do_vmload, and the following should >> probably also changed to #GP as well. >> >> if (!nestedsvm_vmcb_map(v, vmcbaddr)) { >> gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "VMSAVE: mapping vmcb failed, injecting >> #UD\n"); >> ret = TRAP_invalid_op; >> goto inject; >> } > > Yes, that sounds right. Wait, documentation (http://support.amd.com/us/Processor_TechDocs/24593_APM_v2.pdf, page 470) says: VMLOAD and VMSAVE are available only at CPL-0 (#GP otherwise), and in protected mode with SVM enabled in EFER.SVME (#UD otherwise). Check the code path if EFER.SVME is guaranteed to be set. If not #UD is correct. Christoph _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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