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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 21/21] libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guest
On 06/06/13 19:52, Ian Jackson wrote:
> These functions take guest pfns and look them up in the p2m. They did
> no range checking.
>
> However, some callers, notably xc_dom_boot.c:setup_hypercall_page want
> to pass untrusted guest-supplied value(s). It is most convenient to
> detect this here and return INVALID_MFN.
>
> This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> tools/libxc/xc_dom.h | 4 ++++
> 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
> index 567913f..239ef33 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
> @@ -341,6 +341,8 @@ static inline xen_pfn_t xc_dom_p2m_host(struct
> xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t pfn)
> {
> if (dom->shadow_enabled)
> return pfn;
> + if (pfn >= dom->rambase_pfn + dom->total_pages)
> + return INVALID_MFN;
Need to check whether pfn < dom->rambase_pfn otherwise you can just as
easily underflow the array.
~Andrew
> return dom->p2m_host[pfn - dom->rambase_pfn];
> }
>
> @@ -349,6 +351,8 @@ static inline xen_pfn_t xc_dom_p2m_guest(struct
> xc_dom_image *dom,
> {
> if (xc_dom_feature_translated(dom))
> return pfn;
> + if (pfn >= dom->rambase_pfn + dom->total_pages)
> + return INVALID_MFN;
> return dom->p2m_host[pfn - dom->rambase_pfn];
> }
>
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