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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] AMD/intremap: Prevent use of per-device vector maps until irq logic is fixed



>>> On 03.06.13 at 16:35, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 03/06/13 15:07, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 31.05.13 at 22:04, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> In an effort to get AMD systems back to a non-regressed state, introduce a 
>>> new
>>> type of vector map called per-device-global.  This uses per-device vector 
>>> maps
>>> in the IOMMU, but uses a single used_vector map for the core IRQ logic.
>> So what's the reason for not simply using OPT_IRQ_VECTOR_MAP_GLOBAL
>> here?
> 
> Simply to make it obviously different until the core problem is fixed,
> at which point I expect OPT_IRQ_VECTOR_MAP_PERDEV_GLOBAL to disappear.

That's not a really good excuse...

>>> This patch is intended to be removed as soon as the per-device logic is 
>>> fixed
>>> correctly.
>> As a last resort thing this may be acceptable, but I'd much favor to
>> fix this properly rather than hacking it like this.
> 
> While I agree that a proper fix would be good, what is going to happen
> about 4.2 and 4.1 which wont have this new functionality backported? 
> Futhermore, unless this new functionalty is going to race into 4.3 at
> the last moment, 4.3 will also be in a regressed state.

The new functionality (multi-vector MSI) doesn't necessarily need
to be backported, but if the prereq change turns out to fix a bug,
I don't see a reason not to try to backport that one.

As to getting the patch in for 4.3 - George, would you revisit your
opinion on the part of the multi-vector MSI series that originally
I had hoped to get into 4.3 anyway?

>>  Hence I'd really like
>> to put up for discussion to instead use the patch[1] already posted
>> as preparatory for the multi-vector MSI support doing away with the
>> use of the vector for indexing the IRTE (and, in a second patch[2],
>> the enforcement of OPT_IRQ_VECTOR_MAP_PERDEV).
>>
>> Also, overriding a command line request in the way you do is a
>> no-go imo - even if this would cause [theoretical] problems,
> 
> Not theoretical.  I have reproduced the issue, albeit with a modified
> Xen which deliberately limits the range of vectors considered for a
> certain device, to increase the chances of a collision.

You misunderstood my use of "theoretical": On a system with only
MSI devices, no problem is to be expected afaict. Yet your change
would affect those too.

>>  we
>> ought to honor the request as long as we can't tell for sure that
>> this is going to break the specific system. That's even more so
>> since requesting per-device vector maps to be used on VT-d ought
>> to yield exactly the same effect, yet you don't override the mode
>> there.
> 
> Anyone using these vector maps with VT-d is mad.  I could tweak the
> patch to not override the command line but simply warn when global is
> chosen.

Let's take a step back: What do we need those vector maps for in
the first place, other than the disambiguation of AMD IOMMU
IRTEs? If the answer is "nothing", then why was a command line
option controlling this added in the first place? And in that case
ripping them out the moment the patches mentioned above go in
would seem like the right thing to do. George, I think you added all
that - do you have any thoughts here?

>> Furthermore, if only MSI-X devices currently suffer from this, the
>> scalability effect this has (allowing nor more than about 200
>> vectors to be in use even on huge systems) would call for limiting
>> the effect to MSI-X capable devices (or perhaps even to devices
>> actually using MSI-X).
> 
> As I said, this reverts to the behaviour before XSA-36, but without the
> security issue of a single IOMMU interrupt remapping table.  Before
> XSA-36, all AMD systems were limited in vector range because of the
> global used_vector map.

Right, so you'd trade one regression for another (less severe, but
anyway).

Jan


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