|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RESEND 4/4] xen: rename IS_PRIV to is_hardware_domain
On 03/05/2013 15:09, "Daniel De Graaf" <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Since the remaining uses of IS_PRIV are actually concerned with the
> domain having control of the hardware (i.e. being the initial domain),
> clarify this by renaming IS_PRIV to is_hardware_domain. This also
> removes IS_PRIV_FOR since the only remaining user was xsm/dummy.h.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (for 4.3 release)
> Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> ---
> xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 6 +++---
> xen/arch/x86/msi.c | 2 +-
> xen/arch/x86/physdev.c | 4 ++--
> xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 12 ++++++------
> xen/include/xen/sched.h | 12 ++++++++++--
> xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
> 6 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
> index 1f16ad2..c2a04c4 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
> @@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
> while ( i-- )
> clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i);
> if ( iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) &&
> - IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
> + is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
> printk(XENLOG_ERR
> "memory_map: failed to deny dom%d access to
> [%lx,%lx]\n",
> d->domain_id, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
> @@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
> ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
> if ( !ret && add )
> ret = -EIO;
> - if ( ret && IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
> + if ( ret && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
> printk(XENLOG_ERR
> "memory_map: error %ld %s dom%d access to
> [%lx,%lx]\n",
> ret, add ? "removing" : "denying", d->domain_id,
> @@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
> break;
> }
> ret = ioports_deny_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
> - if ( ret && IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
> + if ( ret && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
> printk(XENLOG_ERR
> "ioport_map: error %ld denying dom%d access to
> [%x,%x]\n",
> ret, d->domain_id, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
> index 36bed29..a2ceea0 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
> @@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
> break;
> if ( d )
> {
> - if ( !IS_PRIV(d) && dev->msix_warned != d->domain_id )
> + if ( !is_hardware_domain(d) && dev->msix_warned !=
> d->domain_id )
> {
> dev->msix_warned = d->domain_id;
> printk(XENLOG_ERR
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
> index eb8a407..3733c7a 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
> @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int type, int *index,
> int *pirq_p,
> irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(current->domain, *index);
> if ( irq <= 0 )
> {
> - if ( IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
> + if ( is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
> irq = *index;
> else {
> dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: map pirq with incorrect
> irq!\n",
> @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ ret_t do_physdev_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void)
> arg)
> case PHYSDEVOP_dbgp_op: {
> struct physdev_dbgp_op op;
>
> - if ( !IS_PRIV(v->domain) )
> + if ( !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) )
> ret = -EPERM;
> else if ( copy_from_guest(&op, arg, 1) )
> ret = -EFAULT;
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> index fbbe31d..e0bc60d 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> @@ -1303,7 +1303,7 @@ static int fixup_page_fault(unsigned long addr, struct
> cpu_user_regs *regs)
> ptwr_do_page_fault(v, addr, regs) )
> return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
>
> - if ( IS_PRIV(d) && (regs->error_code & PFEC_page_present) &&
> + if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && (regs->error_code & PFEC_page_present)
> &&
> mmio_ro_do_page_fault(v, addr, regs) )
> return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
> }
> @@ -1623,7 +1623,7 @@ static int pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *d, int write, int
> size)
> {
> uint32_t machine_bdf;
> uint16_t start, end;
> - if (!IS_PRIV(d))
> + if (!is_hardware_domain(d))
> return 0;
>
> machine_bdf = (d->arch.pci_cf8 >> 8) & 0xFFFF;
> @@ -2415,7 +2415,7 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs
> *regs)
> if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
> boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x10 || boot_cpu_data.x86 > 0x17 )
> goto fail;
> - if ( !IS_PRIV(v->domain) || !is_pinned_vcpu(v) )
> + if ( !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) || !is_pinned_vcpu(v) )
> break;
> if ( (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG, val) != 0) ||
> (eax != (uint32_t)val) ||
> @@ -2428,7 +2428,7 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs
> *regs)
> if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
> boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x10 || boot_cpu_data.x86 > 0x17 )
> goto fail;
> - if ( !IS_PRIV(v->domain) || !is_pinned_vcpu(v) )
> + if ( !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) || !is_pinned_vcpu(v) )
> break;
> if ( (rdmsr_safe(MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE, val) != 0) )
> goto fail;
> @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs
> *regs)
> case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
> if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL )
> goto fail;
> - if ( !IS_PRIV(v->domain) || !is_pinned_vcpu(v) )
> + if ( !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) || !is_pinned_vcpu(v) )
> break;
> if ( rdmsr_safe(regs->ecx, val) )
> goto fail;
> @@ -2484,7 +2484,7 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs
> *regs)
> case MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS:
> if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL )
> goto fail;
> - if ( !IS_PRIV(v->domain) || !is_pinned_vcpu(v) )
> + if ( !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) || !is_pinned_vcpu(v) )
> break;
> if ( wrmsr_safe(regs->ecx, msr_content) != 0 )
> goto fail;
> diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> index cb3baed..5b55c09 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> @@ -716,8 +716,16 @@ uint64_t get_cpu_idle_time(unsigned int cpu);
> void watchdog_domain_init(struct domain *d);
> void watchdog_domain_destroy(struct domain *d);
>
> -#define IS_PRIV(_d) ((_d)->is_privileged)
> -#define IS_PRIV_FOR(_d, _t) (IS_PRIV(_d) || ((_d)->target && (_d)->target ==
> (_t)))
> +/*
> + * Use this check when the following are both true:
> + * - Using this feature or interface requires full access to the hardware
> + * (that is, this is would not be suitable for a driver domain)
> + * - There is never a reason to deny dom0 access to this
> + */
> +#define is_hardware_domain(_d) ((_d)->is_privileged)
> +
> +/* This check is for functionality specific to a control domain */
> +#define is_control_domain(_d) ((_d)->is_privileged)
>
> #define VM_ASSIST(_d,_t) (test_bit((_t), &(_d)->vm_assist))
>
> diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
> index 3912bd9..a872056 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
> @@ -60,17 +60,23 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action(
> case XSM_HOOK:
> return 0;
> case XSM_DM_PRIV:
> - if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(src, target) )
> - return -EPERM;
> - return 0;
> + if ( src->is_privileged )
> + return 0;
> + if ( target && src->target == target )
> + return 0;
> + return -EPERM;
> case XSM_TARGET:
> - if ( src != target && !IS_PRIV_FOR(src, target) )
> - return -EPERM;
> - return 0;
> + if ( src == target )
> + return 0;
> + if ( src->is_privileged )
> + return 0;
> + if ( target && src->target == target )
> + return 0;
> + return -EPERM;
> case XSM_PRIV:
> - if ( !IS_PRIV(src) )
> - return -EPERM;
> - return 0;
> + if ( src->is_privileged )
> + return 0;
> + return -EPERM;
> default:
> LINKER_BUG_ON(1);
> return -EPERM;
> @@ -567,10 +573,12 @@ static XSM_INLINE int
> xsm_domain_memory_map(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
> static XSM_INLINE int xsm_mmu_update(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct
> domain *t,
> struct domain *f, uint32_t flags)
> {
> + int rc;
> XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET);
> - if ( t && d != t && !IS_PRIV_FOR(d, t) )
> - return -EPERM;
> - return xsm_default_action(action, d, f);
> + rc = xsm_default_action(action, d, f);
> + if ( t && !rc )
> + rc = xsm_default_action(action, d, t);
> + return rc;
> }
>
> static XSM_INLINE int xsm_mmuext_op(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct
> domain *f)
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
 |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |