[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] Xen/vMCE: bugfix to remove problematic is_vmce_ready check
>>> On 03.05.13 at 10:41, "Liu, Jinsong" <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 27.04.13 at 10:38, "Liu, Jinsong" <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> From 9098666db640183f894b9aec09599dd32dddb7fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 >>> 2001 From: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> >>> Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:37:35 +0800 >>> Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Xen/vMCE: bugfix to remove problematic >>> is_vmce_ready check >>> >>> is_vmce_ready() is problematic: >>> * For dom0, it checks if virq bind to dom0 mcelog driver. If not, it >>> results dom0 crash. However, it's problematic and overkilled since >>> mcelog as a dom0 feature could be enabled/disabled per dom0 option: >>> (XEN) MCE: This error page is ownded by DOM 0 >>> (XEN) DOM0 not ready for vMCE >>> (XEN) domain_crash called from mcaction.c:133 >>> (XEN) Domain 0 reported crashed by domain 32767 on cpu#31: >>> (XEN) Domain 0 crashed: rebooting machine in 5 seconds. >>> (XEN) Resetting with ACPI MEMORY or I/O RESET_REG. >>> >>> * For dom0, if really need check, it should check whether vMCE >>> injection for dom0 ready (say, exception trap bounce check, which >>> has been done at inject_vmce()), not check dom0 mcelog ready (which >>> has been done at mce_softirq() before send global virq to dom0). >> >> Following the argumentation above, I wonder which of the other >> "goto vmce_failed" are really appropriate, i.e. whether the patch >> shouldn't be extended (at least for the Dom0 case). > > You mean other 'goto vmce_failed' are also not appropriate (I'm not quite > clear your point)? Yes. > Would you please point out which point you think not appropriate? I question whether it is correct/necessary to crash the domain in any of those failure cases. Perhaps when we fail to unmap the page it is, but failure of fill_vmsr_data() and inject_vmce() don't appear to be valid reasons once the is_vmce_ready() path is being dropped. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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