[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] libxl: do not assume Dom0 backend while listing disks and nics
On Wed, 2013-05-01 at 21:52 +0100, Marek Marczykowski wrote: > On 01.05.2013 12:29, Ian Jackson wrote: > > Marek Marczykowski writes ("[PATCH 1/2] libxl: do not assume Dom0 backend > > while listing disks and nics"): > >> One more place where code assumed that all backends are in dom0. List > >> devices in domain device/ tree, instead of backend/ of dom0. > >> Additionally fix libxl_devid_to_device_{nic,disk} to fill backend_domid > >> properly. > > > > After this change, can a guest cause a backend to be leaked when the > > domain is destroyed ? If it deletes the contents of the frontend > > directory in xenstore, I think the device will no longer show up in > > the lists and so won't be deleted when the guest goes away. > > Which is currently the problem for every non-dom0 backend, even without > malicious domain action. > Currently I've some python script which watch xenstore and remove leftover > backends... > > > Would iterating over all domains looking for backends for a particular > > frontend domain work ? That would allow a rogue guest to cause > > entries to appear in the list of course, by pretending to be a > > backend domain... > > Perhaps frontend domain shouldn't have permissions to remove device directory, > only modify some of entries, like state, feature-* etc. Does xenstore support > something like: > 1. allow creating new entries and modify some existing > 2. disallow modify and/or remove some entries, in the same directory I'm reasonably certain that in order to enable #1 you cannot have #2 (or vice versa), since create/remove permissions is tied to the perms of the containing directory. Or at least I think so, but I do know that XS perms are a bit quirky. You could have a play with xenstore-chmod though and see what you can see. http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/XenBus#Permissions seems to be the best (AKA only!) reference for the Xenbus permissions model I can find. Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |