[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 01/12] xen/events: avoid race with raising an event in unmask_evtchn()
On 20/03/13 11:00, Stefano Stabellini wrote: > On Tue, 19 Mar 2013, David Vrabel wrote: >> From: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx> >> >> In unmask_evtchn(), when the mask bit is cleared after testing for >> pending and the event becomes pending between the test and clear, then >> the upcall will not become pending and the event may be lost or >> delayed. >> >> Avoid this by always clearing the mask bit before checking for >> pending. >> >> This fixes a regression introduced in 3.7 by >> b5e579232d635b79a3da052964cb357ccda8d9ea (xen/events: fix >> unmask_evtchn for PV on HVM guests) which reordered the clear mask and >> check pending operations. > > The race you are trying to fix is real, but the fix you are proposing > breaks PV on HVM and ARM guests again. > > From the description of b5e579232d635b79a3da052964cb357ccda8d9ea, it's > clear that the reason to call EVTCHNOP_unmask is to trigger an event > notification injection again. > But if you clear the evtchn_mask bit *before* calling EVTCHNOP_unmask, > EVTCHNOP_unmask won't reinject the event. > From evtchn_unmask: > > if ( test_and_clear_bit(port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_mask)) && > test_bit (port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_pending)) && > !test_and_set_bit (port / BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d), > &vcpu_info(v, evtchn_pending_sel)) ) > { > vcpu_mark_events_pending(v); > } > > The first condition for reinjection would fail. I missed this. The only way I can think of fixing this is to set the mask bit before call the unmask hypercall. The FIFO-based ABI doesn't have this problem as it always tries to relink the event whatever the previous state of the mask bit was. David >> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx> >> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx >> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> --- >> drivers/xen/events.c | 10 +++++----- >> 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/drivers/xen/events.c b/drivers/xen/events.c >> index d17aa41..4bdd0a5 100644 >> --- a/drivers/xen/events.c >> +++ b/drivers/xen/events.c >> @@ -403,11 +403,13 @@ static void unmask_evtchn(int port) >> >> if (unlikely((cpu != cpu_from_evtchn(port)))) >> do_hypercall = 1; >> - else >> + else { >> + sync_clear_bit(port, BM(&s->evtchn_mask[0])); >> evtchn_pending = sync_test_bit(port, BM(&s->evtchn_pending[0])); >> >> - if (unlikely(evtchn_pending && xen_hvm_domain())) >> - do_hypercall = 1; >> + if (unlikely(evtchn_pending && xen_hvm_domain())) >> + do_hypercall = 1; >> + } >> >> /* Slow path (hypercall) if this is a non-local port or if this is >> * an hvm domain and an event is pending (hvm domains don't have >> @@ -418,8 +420,6 @@ static void unmask_evtchn(int port) >> } else { >> struct vcpu_info *vcpu_info = __this_cpu_read(xen_vcpu); >> >> - sync_clear_bit(port, BM(&s->evtchn_mask[0])); >> - >> /* >> * The following is basically the equivalent of >> * 'hw_resend_irq'. Just like a real IO-APIC we 'lose >> -- >> 1.7.2.5 >> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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