[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] IO-APIC pages being accessed by ACPI methods
All, considering the non-negligible number of systems where firmware has ACPI methods that reference IO-APIC pages (causing method execution to fail on non-pvops Dom0, and crashing pvops), I'm wondering whether we shouldn't relax treatment of IO-APIC MMIO space by moving it from the completely access denied state that it's currently in (due to construct_dom0() having /* I/O APICs. */ for ( i = 0; i < nr_ioapics; i++ ) { mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_ioapics[i].mpc_apicaddr); if ( smp_found_config ) rc |= iomem_deny_access(dom0, mfn, mfn); } ) to allowing read access, and dropping writes (through the MMIO R/O emulation added for specific PCI devices during 4.2 development). Afaict this ought to be safe, as no reads of currently defined IO-APIC registers have side effects. But of course we don't know what extensions there might be to come. If we do so (and perhaps even independently of this) we probably ought to enforce consistent cachability attributes on the secondary mappings Dom0 then is able to establish - either by further modifying the requested flags, or by outright denying mapping requests that aren't specifying UC. While the latter would be my preference and would work for the MMCFG case, the ACPI case described here wouldn't be covered - Linux'es ACPICA creates cachable mappings regardless of whether a SystemMemory is RAM or MMIO (thus risking problems even on native). Opinions appreciated, Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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