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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-4.1-testing test] 15444: regressions - FAIL
flight 15444 xen-4.1-testing real [real] http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs/15444/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win-vcpus1 12 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail REGR. vs. 15426 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 12 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail REGR. vs. 15426 Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking): test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel 8 debian-fixup fail like 15426 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf 5 xen-boot fail REGR. vs. 15426 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: build-armhf 4 xen-build fail never pass test-amd64-i386-win-vcpus1 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-i386-i386-qemut-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-i386-i386-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-i386-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-win-vcpus1 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-win-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-qemut-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-i386-i386-xl-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen 130446135528 baseline version: xen e5ed73d172eb ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxx> David Scott <dave.scott@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Matthew Daley <mattjd@xxxxxxxxx> ------------------------------------------------------------ jobs: build-amd64 pass build-armhf fail build-i386 pass build-amd64-oldkern pass build-i386-oldkern pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-i386-i386-xl pass test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-credit2 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel fail test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-xl-multivcpu pass test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-i386-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin pass test-amd64-amd64-pv pass test-amd64-i386-pv pass test-i386-i386-pv pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf fail test-amd64-i386-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-amd64-win fail test-amd64-i386-win fail test-i386-i386-win fail test-amd64-amd64-qemut-win fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-win fail test-i386-i386-qemut-win fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win fail test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-win fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-win fail test-i386-i386-xl-win fail test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail test-i386-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 fail test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 fail ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on woking.cam.xci-test.com logs: /home/xc_osstest/logs images: /home/xc_osstest/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ changeset: 23453:130446135528 tag: tip user: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> date: Thu Feb 07 14:26:37 2013 +0000 oxenstored: Enforce a maximum message size of 4096 bytes The maximum size of a message is part of the protocol spec in xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h Before this patch a client which sends an overly large message can cause a buffer read overrun. Note if a badly-behaved client sends a very large message then it will be difficult for them to make their connection work again-- they will probably need to reboot. This is a security issue, part of XSA-38 / CVE-2013-0215. Signed-off-by: David Scott <dave.scott@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> xen-unstable changeset: 26522:ffd30e7388ad Backport-requested-by: security@xxxxxxx Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> changeset: 23452:47c7b8531923 user: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> date: Thu Feb 07 14:26:29 2013 +0000 tools/ocaml: oxenstored: Be more paranoid about ring reading oxenstored makes use of the OCaml Xenbus bindings, in which the function xs_ring_read in tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c is used to read from the shared memory Xenstore ring. This function does not correctly handle all possible (prod, cons) states when MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(prod) > MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons). The root cause is the use of the unmasked values of prod and cons to calculate to_read. If prod is set to an out-of-range value, the ring peer can cause to_read to be too large or even negative. This allows the ring peer to force oxenstored to read and write out of range for the buffers leading to a crash or possibly to privilege escalation. Correct this by masking the values of cons and prod at the start, so we only deal with masked values. This makes the logic simpler, as semantically inappropriate values of the upper bits of the ring pointers are simply ignored. The same vulnerability does not exist in the ring writer because the only use made of the unmasked value is the check which prevents the prod pointer overtaking the cons pointer. A ring peer which defeats this check will suffer only lost data. However, additionally, precautions need to be taken to ensure that req_cons and req_prod are only read once in each function. Without the use of volatile or some asm construct, the compiler can "prove" that req_cons and req_prod do not change unexpectedly and is permitted to "amplify" the read of (say) req_cons into two reads at different times, giving two different values for use as cons, and then use the two sources of cons interchangeably. (The use of xen_mb() does not forbid this.) Therefore do the reads of req_cons and req_prod through a volatile pointer in both xs_ring_read and xs_ring_write. This is currently believed to be a theoretical vulnerability as we are not aware of any compilers which amplify reads in this way. This is a security issue, part of XSA-38 / CVE-2013-0215. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@xxxxxxxxx> Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> xen-unstable changeset: 26521:2c0fd406f02c Backport-requested-by: security@xxxxxxx Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> changeset: 23451:e5ed73d172eb user: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxx> date: Tue Feb 05 15:36:34 2013 +0100 AMD,IOMMU: Make per-device interrupt remapping table default Using global interrupt remapping table may be insecure, as described by XSA-36. This patch makes per-device mode default. This is XSA-36 / CVE-2013-0153. Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxx> Moved warning in amd_iov_detect() to location covering all cases. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> xen-unstable changeset: 26519:1af531e7bc2f xen-unstable date: Tue Feb 5 14:22:11 UTC 2013 ======================================== commit 7a3a2aaa8fd1049fa0f033c5113e165900c84758 Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Jan 17 15:52:16 2013 +0000 e1000: fix compile warning introduced by security fix, and debugging e33f918c19e393900b95a2bb6b10668dfe96a8f2, the fix for XSA-41, and its cherry picks in 4.2 and 4.1 introduced this compiler warning: hw/e1000.c:641: warning: 'return' with a value, in function returning void In upstream qemu (where this change came from), e1000_receive returns a value used by queueing machinery to decide whether to try resubmitting the packet later. Returning "size" means that the packet has been dealt with and should not be retried. In this old branch (aka qemu-xen-traditional), this machinery is absent and e1000_receive returns void. Fix the return statement. Also add a debugging statement along the lines of the others in this function. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit 2a1354d655d816feaad7dbdb8364f40a208439c1) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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