[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 3/16]: PVH xen: Add PHYSDEVOP_map_iomem
>>> On 12.01.13 at 02:32, Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > In this patch, we define PHYSDEVOP_map_iomem and add support for > it. Also, XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping code is put into a function so it > can be shared later for PVH. No change in XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping > functionality. Is that to say that a PVH guest will need to issue this for each and every MMIO range? Irrespective of being DomU or Dom0? I would have expected that this could be transparent... Jan > Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@xxxxxxxxxx> > > diff -r ede1afe68962 -r 93d95f6dd693 xen/arch/x86/domctl.c > --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c Fri Jan 11 16:20:38 2013 -0800 > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c Fri Jan 11 16:22:57 2013 -0800 > @@ -46,6 +46,73 @@ static int gdbsx_guest_mem_io( > return (iop->remain ? -EFAULT : 0); > } > > +long domctl_memory_mapping(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, > + unsigned long mfn, unsigned long nr_mfns, > + int add_map) > +{ > + int i; > + long ret = -EINVAL; > + > + if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn || /* wrap? */ > + ((mfn | (mfn + nr_mfns - 1)) >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) || > + (gfn + nr_mfns - 1) < gfn ) /* wrap? */ > + return ret; > + > + ret = -EPERM; > + if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) && > + !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) ) > + return ret; > + > + ret = xsm_iomem_permission(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, add_map); > + if ( ret ) > + return ret; > + > + if ( add_map ) > + { > + printk(XENLOG_G_INFO > + "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n", > + d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns); > + > + ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > + if ( !ret && paging_mode_translate(d) ) > + { > + for ( i = 0; !ret && i < nr_mfns; i++ ) > + if ( !set_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i, _mfn(mfn + i)) ) > + ret = -EIO; > + if ( ret ) > + { > + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING > + "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx\n", > + d->domain_id, gfn + i, mfn + i); > + while ( i-- ) > + clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i); > + if ( iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) && > + IS_PRIV(current->domain) ) > + printk(XENLOG_ERR > + "memory_map: failed to deny dom%d access to > [%lx,%lx]\n", > + d->domain_id, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > + } > + } > + } else { > + printk(XENLOG_G_INFO > + "memory_map:remove: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n", > + d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns); > + > + if ( paging_mode_translate(d) ) > + for ( i = 0; i < nr_mfns; i++ ) > + add_map |= !clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i); > + ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > + if ( !ret && add_map ) > + ret = -EIO; > + if ( ret && IS_PRIV(current->domain) ) > + printk(XENLOG_ERR > + "memory_map: error %ld %s dom%d access to [%lx,%lx]\n", > + ret, add_map ? "removing" : "denying", d->domain_id, > + mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > + } > + return ret; > +} > + > long arch_do_domctl( > struct xen_domctl *domctl, > XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl) > @@ -825,75 +892,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl( > unsigned long mfn = domctl->u.memory_mapping.first_mfn; > unsigned long nr_mfns = domctl->u.memory_mapping.nr_mfns; > int add = domctl->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping; > - unsigned long i; > > - ret = -EINVAL; > - if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn || /* wrap? */ > - ((mfn | (mfn + nr_mfns - 1)) >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) || > - (gfn + nr_mfns - 1) < gfn ) /* wrap? */ > - break; > - > - ret = -EPERM; > - if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) && > - !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - > 1) ) > - break; > > ret = -ESRCH; > if ( unlikely((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domctl->domain)) == NULL) ) > break; > > - ret = xsm_iomem_permission(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, add); > - if ( ret ) { > - rcu_unlock_domain(d); > - break; > - } > - > - if ( add ) > - { > - printk(XENLOG_G_INFO > - "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n", > - d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns); > - > - ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > - if ( !ret && paging_mode_translate(d) ) > - { > - for ( i = 0; !ret && i < nr_mfns; i++ ) > - if ( !set_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i, _mfn(mfn + i)) ) > - ret = -EIO; > - if ( ret ) > - { > - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING > - "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx\n", > - d->domain_id, gfn + i, mfn + i); > - while ( i-- ) > - clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i); > - if ( iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) && > - IS_PRIV(current->domain) ) > - printk(XENLOG_ERR > - "memory_map: failed to deny dom%d access to > [%lx,%lx]\n", > - d->domain_id, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > - } > - } > - } > - else > - { > - printk(XENLOG_G_INFO > - "memory_map:remove: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n", > - d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns); > - > - if ( paging_mode_translate(d) ) > - for ( i = 0; i < nr_mfns; i++ ) > - add |= !clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i); > - ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > - if ( !ret && add ) > - ret = -EIO; > - if ( ret && IS_PRIV(current->domain) ) > - printk(XENLOG_ERR > - "memory_map: error %ld %s dom%d access to > [%lx,%lx]\n", > - ret, add ? "removing" : "denying", d->domain_id, > - mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > - } > - > + ret = domctl_memory_mapping(d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, add); > rcu_unlock_domain(d); > } > break; > diff -r ede1afe68962 -r 93d95f6dd693 xen/arch/x86/physdev.c > --- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c Fri Jan 11 16:20:38 2013 -0800 > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c Fri Jan 11 16:22:57 2013 -0800 > @@ -732,6 +732,24 @@ ret_t do_physdev_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_H > break; > } > > + case PHYSDEVOP_map_iomem : { > + > + struct physdev_map_iomem iomem; > + struct domain *d = current->domain; > + > + ret = -EPERM; > + > + d = rcu_lock_current_domain(); > + > + ret = -EFAULT; > + if ( copy_from_guest(&iomem, arg, 1) != 0 ) > + break; > + > + ret = domctl_memory_mapping(d, iomem.first_gfn, iomem.first_mfn, > + iomem.nr_mfns, iomem.add_mapping); > + break; > + } > + > default: > ret = -ENOSYS; > break; > diff -r ede1afe68962 -r 93d95f6dd693 xen/include/public/physdev.h > --- a/xen/include/public/physdev.h Fri Jan 11 16:20:38 2013 -0800 > +++ b/xen/include/public/physdev.h Fri Jan 11 16:22:57 2013 -0800 > @@ -330,6 +330,19 @@ struct physdev_dbgp_op { > typedef struct physdev_dbgp_op physdev_dbgp_op_t; > DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(physdev_dbgp_op_t); > > + > +#define PHYSDEVOP_map_iomem 30 > +struct physdev_map_iomem { > + /* IN */ > + unsigned long first_gfn; > + unsigned long first_mfn; > + unsigned int nr_mfns; > + unsigned int add_mapping; /* 1 == add mapping; 0 == unmap */ > + > +}; > +typedef struct physdev_map_iomem physdev_map_iomem_t; > +DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(physdev_map_iomem_t); > + > /* > * Notify that some PIRQ-bound event channels have been unmasked. > * ** This command is obsolete since interface version 0x00030202 and is ** > diff -r ede1afe68962 -r 93d95f6dd693 xen/include/xen/domain.h > --- a/xen/include/xen/domain.h Fri Jan 11 16:20:38 2013 -0800 > +++ b/xen/include/xen/domain.h Fri Jan 11 16:22:57 2013 -0800 > @@ -86,4 +86,7 @@ extern unsigned int xen_processor_pmbits > > extern bool_t opt_dom0_vcpus_pin; > > +extern long domctl_memory_mapping(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, > + unsigned long mfn, unsigned long nr_mfns, int add_map); > + > #endif /* __XEN_DOMAIN_H__ */ > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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