Re: [Xen-devel] [PVH]: Help: msi.c

[Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 02:25:16PM +0000, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Thu, 13 Dec 2012, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > >>> On 13.12.12 at 13:19, Stefano Stabellini 
> > >>> <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > wrote:
> > > On Thu, 13 Dec 2012, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > >> >>> On 13.12.12 at 02:43, Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >> > On Wed, 12 Dec 2012 17:15:23 -0800
> > >> > Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >> > 
> > >> >> On Tue, 11 Dec 2012 12:10:19 +0000
> > >> >> Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >> >> 
> > >> >> > On Tue, 11 Dec 2012, Mukesh Rathor wrote:
> > >> >> > > On Mon, 10 Dec 2012 09:43:34 +0000
> > >> >> > > "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >> >> > 
> > >> >> > That's strange because AFAIK Linux is never editing the MSI-X
> > >> >> > entries directly: give a look at
> > >> >> > arch/x86/pci/xen.c:xen_initdom_setup_msi_irqs, Linux only remaps
> > >> >> > MSIs into pirqs using hypercalls. Xen should be the only one to
> > >> >> > touch the real MSI-X table.
> > >> >> 
> > >> >> So, this is what's happening. The side effect of :
> > >> >> 
> > >> >>         if ( rangeset_add_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_table.first,
> > >> >>                                 dev->msix_table.last) )
> > >> >>             WARN();
> > >> >>         if ( rangeset_add_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_pba.first,
> > >> >>                                 dev->msix_pba.last) )
> > >> >>             WARN();
> > >> >> 
> > >> >> in msix_capability_init() in xen is that the dom0 EPT entries that
> > >> >> I've mapped are going from RW to read only. Then when dom0 accesses
> > >> >> it, I get EPT violation. In case of pure PV, the PTE entry to access
> > >> >> the iomem is RW, and the above rangeset adding doesn't affect it. I
> > >> >> don't understand why? Looking into that now...
> > >> 
> > >> As far as I was able to tell back at the time when I implemented
> > >> this, existing code shouldn't have mappings for these tables in
> > >> place at the time these ranges get added here. But I noted in
> > >> the patch description that this is a potential issue (and may need
> > >> fixing if deemed severe enough - back then, apparently nobody
> > >> really cared, perhaps largely because passthrough to PV guests
> > >> isn't considered fully secure anyway).
> > >> 
> > >> Now - did that change? I.e. can you describe where the mappings
> > >> come from that cause the problem here?
> > > 
> > > The generic Linux MSI-X handling code does that, before calling the
> > > arch specific msi setup function, for which we have a xen version
> > > (xen_initdom_setup_msi_irqs):
> > > 
> > > pci_enable_msix -> msix_capability_init -> msix_map_region
> > 
> > Ah, okay, (of course?) I had looked only at the forward ported
> > version of this. Is all that fiddling with the mask bits really
> > being suppressed properly when running under Xen? Otherwise
> > pv-ops is quite broken in this regard at present... And if it is,
> > I don't see what the respective ioremap() is good for here in
> > the Xen case.
> 
> Actually I think that you might be right: just looking at the code it
> seems that the mask bits get written to the table once as part of the
> initialization process:
> 
> pci_enable_msix -> msix_capability_init -> msix_program_entries
> 
> Unfortunately msix_program_entries is called few lines after
> arch_setup_msi_irqs, where we call PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq to map the MSI as
> a pirq.
> However after that is done, all the masking/unmask is done via irq_mask
> that we handle properly masking/unmasking the corresponding event
> channels.
> 
> 
> Possible solutions on top of my head:

There is also the potential to piggyback on Joerg's patches
that introduce a new x86_msi_ops: compose_msi_msg.

See here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/8/20/432
(I think there was also a more recent one posted at some point).

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