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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-unstable test] 14775: regressions - FAIL
flight 14775 xen-unstable real [real] http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs/14775/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-amd64-amd64-qemut-win 7 windows-install fail REGR. vs. 14771 Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking): test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin 10 guest-saverestore fail like 14771 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf 5 xen-boot fail like 14771 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel 9 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-win-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-win-vcpus1 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-win-vcpus1 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen 3664b0420dfa baseline version: xen f50aab21f9f2 ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> ------------------------------------------------------------ jobs: build-amd64 pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-oldkern pass build-i386-oldkern pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-credit2 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel fail test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-xl-multivcpu pass test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin fail test-amd64-amd64-pv pass test-amd64-i386-pv pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf fail test-amd64-i386-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-amd64-win fail test-amd64-i386-win fail test-amd64-amd64-qemut-win fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-win fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-win fail test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 fail ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on woking.cam.xci-test.com logs: /home/xc_osstest/logs images: /home/xc_osstest/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ changeset: 26283:3664b0420dfa tag: tip user: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> date: Mon Dec 17 18:04:54 2012 +0000 libxenstore: filter watch events in libxenstore when we unwatch XenStore puts in queued watch events via a thread and notifies the user. Sometimes xs_unwatch is called before all related message is read. The use case is non-threaded libevent, we have two event A and B: - Event A will destroy something and call xs_unwatch; - Event B is used to notify that a node has changed in XenStore. As the event is called one by one, event A can be handled before event B. So on next xs_watch_read the user could retrieve an unwatch token and a segfault occured if the token store the pointer of the structure (ie: "backend:0xcafe"). To avoid problem with previous application using libXenStore, this behaviour will only be enabled if XS_UNWATCH_FILTER is given to xs_open. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> changeset: 26282:f50aab21f9f2 user: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> date: Thu Dec 13 14:39:31 2012 +0000 x86/kexec: Change NMI and MCE handling on kexec path Experimentally, certain crash kernels will triple fault very early after starting if started with NMIs disabled. This was discovered when experimenting with a debug keyhandler which deliberately created a reentrant NMI, causing stack corruption. Because of this discovered bug, and that the future changes to the NMI handling will make the kexec path more fragile, take the time now to bullet-proof the kexec behaviour to be safer in more circumstances. This patch adds three new low level routines: * nmi_crash This is a special NMI handler for using during a kexec crash. * enable_nmis This function enables NMIs by executing an iret-to-self, to disengage the hardware NMI latch. * trap_nop This is a no op handler which irets immediately. It is not declared with ENTRY() to avoid the extra alignment overhead. And adds three new IDT entry helper routines: * _write_gate_lower This is a substitute for using cmpxchg16b to update a 128bit structure at once. It assumes that the top 64 bits are unchanged (and ASSERT()s the fact) and performs a regular write on the lower 64 bits. * _set_gate_lower This is functionally equivalent to the already present _set_gate(), except it uses _write_gate_lower rather than updating both 64bit values. * _update_gate_addr_lower This is designed to update an IDT entry handler only, without altering any other settings in the entry. It also uses _write_gate_lower. The IDT entry helpers are required because: * Is it unsafe to attempt a disable/update/re-enable cycle on the NMI or MCE IDT entries. * We need to be able to update NMI handlers without changing the IST entry. As a result, the new behaviour of the kexec_crash path is: nmi_shootdown_cpus() will: * Disable the crashing cpus NMI/MCE interrupt stack tables. Disabling the stack tables removes race conditions which would lead to corrupt exception frames and infinite loops. As this pcpu is never planning to execute a sysret back to a pv vcpu, the update is safe from a security point of view. * Swap the NMI trap handlers. The crashing pcpu gets the nop handler, to prevent it getting stuck in an NMI context, causing a hang instead of crash. The non-crashing pcpus all get the nmi_crash handler which is designed never to return. do_nmi_crash() will: * Save the crash notes and shut the pcpu down. There is now an extra per-cpu variable to prevent us from executing this multiple times. In the case where we reenter midway through, attempt the whole operation again in preference to not completing it in the first place. * Set up another NMI at the LAPIC. Even when the LAPIC has been disabled, the ID and command registers are still usable. As a result, we can deliberately queue up a new NMI to re-interrupt us later if NMIs get unlatched. Because of the call to __stop_this_cpu(), we have to hand craft self_nmi() to be safe from General Protection Faults. * Fall into infinite loop. machine_kexec() will: * Swap the MCE handlers to be a nop. We cannot prevent MCEs from being delivered when we pass off to the crash kernel, and the less Xen context is being touched the better. * Explicitly enable NMIs. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> Minor style changes. Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> ======================================== commit 6a0cf3786f1964fdf5a17f88f26cb499f4e89c81 Author: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Dec 6 12:35:58 2012 +0000 qemu-stubdom: prevent useless medium change qemu-stubdom was stripping the prefix from the "params" xenstore key in xenstore_parse_domain_config, which was then saved stripped in a variable. In xenstore_process_event we compare the "param" from xenstore (not stripped) with the stripped "param" saved in the variable, which leads to a medium change (even if there isn't any), since we are comparing something like aio:/path/to/file with /path/to/file. This only happens one time, since xenstore_parse_domain_config is the only place where we strip the prefix. The result of this bug is the following: xs_read_watch() -> /local/domain/0/backend/qdisk/19/5632/params hdc close(7) close blk: backend=/local/domain/0/backend/qdisk/19/5632 node=/local/domain/19/device/vbd/5632 (XEN) HVM18: HVM Loader (XEN) HVM18: Detected Xen v4.3-unstable (XEN) HVM18: Xenbus rings @0xfeffc000, event channel 4 (XEN) HVM18: System requested ROMBIOS (XEN) HVM18: CPU speed is 2400 MHz (XEN) irq.c:270: Dom18 PCI link 0 changed 0 -> 5 (XEN) HVM18: PCI-ISA link 0 routed to IRQ5 (XEN) irq.c:270: Dom18 PCI link 1 changed 0 -> 10 (XEN) HVM18: PCI-ISA link 1 routed to IRQ10 (XEN) irq.c:270: Dom18 PCI link 2 changed 0 -> 11 (XEN) HVM18: PCI-ISA link 2 routed to IRQ11 (XEN) irq.c:270: Dom18 PCI link 3 changed 0 -> 5 (XEN) HVM18: PCI-ISA link 3 routed to IRQ5 (XEN) HVM18: pci dev 01:3 INTA->IRQ10 (XEN) HVM18: pci dev 03:0 INTA->IRQ5 (XEN) HVM18: pci dev 04:0 INTA->IRQ5 (XEN) HVM18: pci dev 02:0 bar 10 size lx: 02000000 (XEN) HVM18: pci dev 03:0 bar 14 size lx: 01000000 (XEN) HVM18: pci dev 02:0 bar 14 size lx: 00001000 (XEN) HVM18: pci dev 03:0 bar 10 size lx: 00000100 (XEN) HVM18: pci dev 04:0 bar 10 size lx: 00000100 (XEN) HVM18: pci dev 04:0 bar 14 size lx: 00000100 (XEN) HVM18: pci dev 01:1 bar 20 size lx: 00000010 (XEN) HVM18: Multiprocessor initialisation: (XEN) HVM18: - CPU0 ... 36-bit phys ... fixed MTRRs ... var MTRRs [2/8] ... done. (XEN) HVM18: - CPU1 ... 36-bit phys ... fixed MTRRs ... var MTRRs [2/8] ... done. (XEN) HVM18: Testing HVM environment: (XEN) HVM18: - REP INSB across page boundaries ... passed (XEN) HVM18: - GS base MSRs and SWAPGS ... passed (XEN) HVM18: Passed 2 of 2 tests (XEN) HVM18: Writing SMBIOS tables ... (XEN) HVM18: Loading ROMBIOS ... (XEN) HVM18: 9660 bytes of ROMBIOS high-memory extensions: (XEN) HVM18: Relocating to 0xfc001000-0xfc0035bc ... done (XEN) HVM18: Creating MP tables ... (XEN) HVM18: Loading Cirrus VGABIOS ... (XEN) HVM18: Loading PCI Option ROM ... (XEN) HVM18: - Manufacturer: http://ipxe.org (XEN) HVM18: - Product name: iPXE (XEN) HVM18: Option ROMs: (XEN) HVM18: c0000-c8fff: VGA BIOS (XEN) HVM18: c9000-d8fff: Etherboot ROM (XEN) HVM18: Loading ACPI ... (XEN) HVM18: vm86 TSS at fc00f680 (XEN) HVM18: BIOS map: (XEN) HVM18: f0000-fffff: Main BIOS (XEN) HVM18: E820 table: (XEN) HVM18: [00]: 00000000:00000000 - 00000000:0009e000: RAM (XEN) HVM18: [01]: 00000000:0009e000 - 00000000:000a0000: RESERVED (XEN) HVM18: HOLE: 00000000:000a0000 - 00000000:000e0000 (XEN) HVM18: [02]: 00000000:000e0000 - 00000000:00100000: RESERVED (XEN) HVM18: [03]: 00000000:00100000 - 00000000:3f800000: RAM (XEN) HVM18: HOLE: 00000000:3f800000 - 00000000:fc000000 (XEN) HVM18: [04]: 00000000:fc000000 - 00000001:00000000: RESERVED (XEN) HVM18: Invoking ROMBIOS ... (XEN) HVM18: $Revision: 1.221 $ $Date: 2008/12/07 17:32:29 $ (XEN) stdvga.c:147:d18 entering stdvga and caching modes (XEN) HVM18: VGABios $Id: vgabios.c,v 1.67 2008/01/27 09:44:12 vruppert Exp $ (XEN) HVM18: Bochs BIOS - build: 06/23/99 (XEN) HVM18: $Revision: 1.221 $ $Date: 2008/12/07 17:32:29 $ (XEN) HVM18: Options: apmbios pcibios eltorito PMM (XEN) HVM18: (XEN) HVM18: ata0-0: PCHS=16383/16/63 translation=lba LCHS=1024/255/63 (XEN) HVM18: ata0 master: QEMU HARDDISK ATA-7 Hard-Disk (10240 MBytes) (XEN) HVM18: IDE time out (XEN) HVM18: ata1 master: QEMU DVD-ROM ATAPI-4 CD-Rom/DVD-Rom (XEN) HVM18: IDE time out (XEN) HVM18: (XEN) HVM18: (XEN) HVM18: (XEN) HVM18: Press F12 for boot menu. (XEN) HVM18: (XEN) HVM18: Booting from CD-Rom... (XEN) HVM18: ata_is_ready returned 1 (XEN) HVM18: CDROM boot failure code : 0003 (XEN) HVM18: Boot from CD-Rom failed: could not read the boot disk (XEN) HVM18: (XEN) HVM18: (XEN) HVM18: No bootable device. (XEN) HVM18: Powering off in 30 seconds. ******************* BLKFRONT for /local/domain/19/device/vbd/5632 ********** backend at /local/domain/0/backend/qdisk/19/5632 Failed to read /local/domain/0/backend/qdisk/19/5632/feature-flush-cache. 284420 sectors of 512 bytes ************************** blk_open(/local/domain/19/device/vbd/5632) -> 7 As seen in this trace, the medium change happens just when the guest is booting, which leads to the guest not being able to boot because the BIOS is not able to access the device. This is a regression from Xen 4.1, which is able to boot from "file:/" based backends when using stubdomains. [ By inspection, this patch does not change the flow for the non-stubdom case. -iwj] Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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