This allows the hardware TPM's PCRs to be accessed from a vTPM for
debugging and as a simple alternative to a deep quote in situations
where the integrity of the vTPM's own TCB is not in question.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
stubdom/Makefile | 1 +
stubdom/vtpm-pcr-passthrough.patch | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
stubdom/vtpm/vtpm_cmd.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 112 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 stubdom/vtpm-pcr-passthrough.patch
diff --git a/stubdom/Makefile b/stubdom/Makefile
index 790b547..03ec07e 100644
--- a/stubdom/Makefile
+++ b/stubdom/Makefile
@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ tpm_emulator-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH):
tpm_emulator-$(TPMEMU_VERSION).tar.gz
patch -d $@ -p1 < vtpm-locality.patch
patch -d $@ -p1 < vtpm-bufsize.patch
patch -d $@ -p1 < vtpm-locality5-pcrs.patch
+ patch -d $@ -p1 < vtpm-pcr-passthrough.patch
mkdir $@/build
cd $@/build; $(CMAKE) .. -DCMAKE_C_COMPILER=${CC} -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS="-std=c99
-DTPM_NO_EXTERN $(TARGET_CPPFLAGS) $(TARGET_CFLAGS) -Wno-declaration-after-statement"
touch $@
diff --git a/stubdom/vtpm-pcr-passthrough.patch
b/stubdom/vtpm-pcr-passthrough.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e898a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stubdom/vtpm-pcr-passthrough.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_capability.c b/tpm/tpm_capability.c
+index f8f7f0f..885af52 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_capability.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_capability.c
+@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static TPM_RESULT cap_property(UINT32 subCapSize, BYTE
*subCap,
+ switch (property) {
+ case TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR:
+ debug("[TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR]");
+- return return_UINT32(respSize, resp, TPM_NUM_PCR);
++ return return_UINT32(respSize, resp, TPM_NUM_PCR_V);
+
+ case TPM_CAP_PROP_DIR:
+ debug("[TPM_CAP_PROP_DIR]");
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.h b/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.h
+index 36a32dd..77ed595 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.h
++++ b/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.h
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ void (*tpm_free)(/*const*/ void *ptr);
+ /* random numbers */
+
+ void (*tpm_get_extern_random_bytes)(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
++void tpm_get_extern_pcr(int index, void *buf);
+
+ /* usec since last call */
+
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_integrity.c b/tpm/tpm_integrity.c
+index 66ece83..f3c4196 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_integrity.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_integrity.c
+@@ -56,8 +56,11 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_Extend(TPM_PCRINDEX pcrNum, TPM_DIGEST
*inDigest,
+ TPM_RESULT TPM_PCRRead(TPM_PCRINDEX pcrIndex, TPM_PCRVALUE *outDigest)
+ {
+ info("TPM_PCRRead()");
+- if (pcrIndex >= TPM_NUM_PCR) return TPM_BADINDEX;
+- memcpy(outDigest, &PCR_VALUE[pcrIndex], sizeof(TPM_PCRVALUE));
++ if (pcrIndex >= TPM_NUM_PCR_V) return TPM_BADINDEX;
++ if (pcrIndex >= TPM_NUM_PCR)
++ tpm_get_extern_pcr(pcrIndex - TPM_NUM_PCR, outDigest);
++ else
++ memcpy(outDigest, &PCR_VALUE[pcrIndex], sizeof(TPM_PCRVALUE));
+ return TPM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+@@ -138,12 +141,15 @@ TPM_RESULT tpm_compute_pcr_digest(TPM_PCR_SELECTION
*pcrSelection,
+ BYTE *buf, *ptr;
+ info("tpm_compute_pcr_digest()");
+ /* create PCR composite */
+- if ((pcrSelection->sizeOfSelect * 8) > TPM_NUM_PCR
++ if ((pcrSelection->sizeOfSelect * 8) > TPM_NUM_PCR_V
+ || pcrSelection->sizeOfSelect == 0) return TPM_INVALID_PCR_INFO;
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < pcrSelection->sizeOfSelect * 8; i++) {
+ /* is PCR number i selected ? */
+ if (pcrSelection->pcrSelect[i >> 3] & (1 << (i & 7))) {
+- memcpy(&comp.pcrValue[j++], &PCR_VALUE[i], sizeof(TPM_PCRVALUE));
++ if (i >= TPM_NUM_PCR)
++ tpm_get_extern_pcr(i - TPM_NUM_PCR, &comp.pcrValue[j++]);
++ else
++ memcpy(&comp.pcrValue[j++], &PCR_VALUE[i], sizeof(TPM_PCRVALUE));
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(&comp.select, pcrSelection, sizeof(TPM_PCR_SELECTION));
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_structures.h b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
+index 08cef1e..8c97fc5 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_structures.h
++++ b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
+@@ -677,6 +677,7 @@ typedef struct tdTPM_CMK_MA_APPROVAL {
+ * Number of PCRs of the TPM (must be a multiple of eight)
+ */
+ #define TPM_NUM_PCR 32
++#define TPM_NUM_PCR_V (TPM_NUM_PCR + 24)
+
+ /*
+ * TPM_PCR_SELECTION ([TPM_Part2], Section 8.1)
diff --git a/stubdom/vtpm/vtpm_cmd.c b/stubdom/vtpm/vtpm_cmd.c
index 7eae98b..ed058fb 100644
--- a/stubdom/vtpm/vtpm_cmd.c
+++ b/stubdom/vtpm/vtpm_cmd.c
@@ -134,6 +134,44 @@ egress:
}
+extern struct tpmfront_dev* tpmfront_dev;
+void tpm_get_extern_pcr(int index, void *buf) {
+ TPM_RESULT status = TPM_SUCCESS;
+ uint8_t* cmdbuf, *resp, *bptr;
+ size_t resplen = 0;
+ UINT32 len;
+
+ /*Ask the real tpm for the PCR value */
+ TPM_TAG tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND;
+ UINT32 size;
+ TPM_COMMAND_CODE ord = TPM_ORD_PCRRead;
+ len = size = sizeof(TPM_TAG) + sizeof(UINT32) + sizeof(TPM_COMMAND_CODE) +
sizeof(UINT32);
+
+ /*Create the raw tpm command */
+ bptr = cmdbuf = malloc(size);
+ TRYFAILGOTO(pack_header(&bptr, &len, tag, size, ord));
+ TRYFAILGOTO(tpm_marshal_UINT32(&bptr, &len, index));
+
+ /* Send cmd, wait for response */
+ TRYFAILGOTOMSG(tpmfront_cmd(tpmfront_dev, cmdbuf, size, &resp, &resplen),
+ ERR_TPMFRONT);
+
+ bptr = resp; len = resplen;
+ TRYFAILGOTOMSG(unpack_header(&bptr, &len, &tag, &size, &ord),
ERR_MALFORMED);
+
+ //Check return status of command
+ CHECKSTATUSGOTO(ord, "TPM_PCRRead()");
+
+ //Get the PCR value out
+ TRYFAILGOTOMSG(tpm_unmarshal_BYTE_ARRAY(&bptr, &len, buf, 20),
ERR_MALFORMED);
+
+ goto egress;
+abort_egress:
+ memset(buf, 0x20, 20);
+egress:
+ free(cmdbuf);
+}
+
TPM_RESULT VTPM_LoadHashKey(struct tpmfront_dev* tpmfront_dev, uint8_t**
data, size_t* data_length)
{
TPM_RESULT status = TPM_SUCCESS;
