Re: [Xen-devel] Hypervisor memory leak/corruption because of guest irqs

[Keir Fraser <keir.xen@xxxxxxxxx>]

Seems it means noone thought properly about teardown of guest-bound irqs.
Probably because a lot of that code was dumbly ported over from Linux later.

As for abuse of desc->action, you could turn that field explicitly into a
discriminated union; it is already precisely discriminated by
desc->status&IRQ_GUEST. Apart from that syntactic sugar, the idea of having
that pointer point at two different things dependent on irq type doesn't
seem ugly to me -- if it's irq-bound then it does not have, nor does it
need, an irqaction. But the irq_guest_action of course has to be dealt with
and your problem is that noone has thought about it!

 -- Keir

On 07/09/2012 19:04, "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Hello,
> 
> I appear to have opened a can of worms here.  This was discovered when
> turning on ASSERT()s, looking for another crash (and adding in 98 new
> ASSERTs, along with some 'type checking' magic constants)
> 
> The issue has been discovered against Xen 4.1.3, but a cursory
> inspection of unstable shows no signs of it being fixed. The relevant
> assertion (which I added) is attached.  (In the process of debugging, I
> also developed the ASSERT_PRINTK(bool, fmt, ...) macro which will be
> upstreamed in due course.)
> 
> The root cause of the problem is the compelete abuse of the
> irq_desc->action pointer being cast to a irq_guest_action_t* when
> in-fact it is an irqaction*, but the (correct) solution is not easy.
> 
> destroy_irq() calls dynamic_irq_cleanup() which xfree()'s desc->action.
> This would be all well and fine if it were only an irqaction pointer.
> However, in this case, it is actually an irq_guest_action_t pointer,
> meaning that we have free()'d an inactive timer, which is on a pcpu's
> inactive timer linked list.  This means that as soon as the free()'d
> memory is reused for something new, the linked list gets trashed, which
> which point all bets are off with regards to the validity of hypervisor
> memory.
> 
> As far as I can tell, this bug only manifests in combination with PCI
> Passthrough, as we only perform cleanup of guest irqs when a domain with
> passthrough is shut down.  The issue was first found by the ASSERT()s in
> __list_del(), when something tried to use the pcpu inactive timer list,
> after the free()'d memory was reused.
> 
> In this specific case, a quick and dirty hack would be to check every
> time we free an action and possibly kill the timer if it is a guest irq.
> 
> Having said that, it is not a correct fix; the utter abuse of
> irq_desc->action has been a ticking timebomb for a long time.
> irq_guest_action_t is private to the 2nd half of irq.c(x86), whereas
> irqaction is common and architecture independent.  The only acceptable
> solution I see is to re-architect a substantial proportion of the irq code.
> 
> Am I missing something obvious? or is the best way to continue (in which
> case I have my work cut out as, it is currently affecting XenServer
> customers) ?



_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel