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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen: clamp bitmaps to correct number of bits



On Thu, 2012-09-06 at 13:23 +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>> On 06.09.12 at 13:56, Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > The principal of least surprise suggests that these bits ought not to
> > be set and this is not a hot path so fix this at the hypervisor layer
> > by clamping the bits in the returned bitmap to the correct limit.
> 
> Hmm, I see your point, but without looking at the description
> above (i.e. if I just saw the code in its post-patch form) I'd be
> immediately tempted to rip this all out again, the more that
> the inverse functions don't do the same. So perhaps extending
> the comment before the newly added function would be useful
> to prevent such desires from coming up?

Agreed.

> > @@ -38,6 +38,17 @@
> >   * for the best explanations of this ordering.
> >   */
> >  
> > +/* Ensure that the last byte is zero from nbits onwards. */
> > +static void clamp_last_byte(uint8_t *bp, int nbits)
> > +{
> > +   int lastbyte = nbits/8;
> > +   int remainder = nbits % 8;
> > +   int mask = ((1U<<remainder)-1)&0xff;
> 
> While I realize the callers use plain int, I'd be very much in favor
> of not continuing this bad practice (the more that you use 1U
> already) - simply make the parameter and all locals (assuming
> you really think they're useful; I would have omitted all but
> "remainder", given they're being used just once) unsigned.

I'll fold them in, it was convenient to have variables while I was
printk'ing what I was doing but not any more.

> And once at it, please insert spaces consistently and drop the
> bogus "&0xff".

Done.

8<----------------------------------------------------

# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
# Date 1346939305 -3600
# Node ID 8652dbb4808f66bc9d85690a5e50fd5b972c6530
# Parent  c0e71dc105f785caccee3e1aec2b18f119e60f04
xen: clamp bitmaps to correct number of bits

Valgrind running xl create reports:
 ==24777== Invalid read of size 4
 ==24777==    at 0x4072805: libxl__get_numa_candidate (libxl_numa.c:203)
 ==24777==    by 0x40680B6: libxl__build_pre (libxl_dom.c:166)
 ==24777==    by 0x405B82E: libxl__domain_build (libxl_create.c:323)
 ==24777==    by 0x405BB9C: domcreate_bootloader_done (libxl_create.c:747)
 ==24777==    by 0x407AD27: bootloader_local_detached_cb 
(libxl_bootloader.c:281)
 ==24777==    by 0x40508D8: local_device_detach_cb (libxl.c:2470)
 ==24777==    by 0x4052B10: libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_detach 
(libxl.c:2445)
 ==24777==    by 0x407AE9F: bootloader_callback (libxl_bootloader.c:265)
 ==24777==    by 0x407C69A: libxl__bootloader_run (libxl_bootloader.c:392)
 ==24777==    by 0x405CB24: do_domain_create (libxl_create.c:687)
 ==24777==    by 0x405CC5E: libxl_domain_create_new (libxl_create.c:1177)
 ==24777==    by 0x805BDE2: create_domain (xl_cmdimpl.c:1812)
 ==24777==  Address 0x42dbdd8 is 8 bytes after a block of size 48 alloc'd
 ==24777==    at 0x4023340: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:593)
 ==24777==    by 0x406D479: libxl__zalloc (libxl_internal.c:88)
 ==24777==    by 0x404EF38: libxl_get_cpu_topology (libxl.c:3707)
 ==24777==    by 0x4072232: libxl__get_numa_candidate (libxl_numa.c:314)
 ==24777==    by 0x40680B6: libxl__build_pre (libxl_dom.c:166)
 ==24777==    by 0x405B82E: libxl__domain_build (libxl_create.c:323)
 ==24777==    by 0x405BB9C: domcreate_bootloader_done (libxl_create.c:747)
 ==24777==    by 0x407AD27: bootloader_local_detached_cb 
(libxl_bootloader.c:281)
 ==24777==    by 0x40508D8: local_device_detach_cb (libxl.c:2470)
 ==24777==    by 0x4052B10: libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_detach 
(libxl.c:2445)
 ==24777==    by 0x407AE9F: bootloader_callback (libxl_bootloader.c:265)
 ==24777==    by 0x407C69A: libxl__bootloader_run (libxl_bootloader.c:392)

This is because with nr_cpus=4 the bitmask returned from Xen
contains 0xff rather than 0x0f bit our bitmap walking routines (e.g.
libxl_for_each_set_bit) round up to the next byte (so it iterates
e.g. 8 times not 4). This then causes us to access of the end of
whatever array we are walking through each set bit for.

The principal of least surprise suggests that these bits ought not to
be set and this is not a hot path so fix this at the hypervisor layer
by clamping the bits in the returned bitmap to the correct limit.

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
---

The impact of this seems to be fairly benign in practice, so I'm not
sure about it for 4.2.0. Could leave to 4.2.1?

Dario,

Any chance you could look at the libxl bitmap functions in 4.3 and
make them use the right limit (i.e. nr_bits not (nr_bits+7)/8?

Thanks,
Ian.

diff -r c0e71dc105f7 -r 8652dbb4808f xen/common/bitmap.c
--- a/xen/common/bitmap.c       Thu Sep 06 14:36:09 2012 +0100
+++ b/xen/common/bitmap.c       Thu Sep 06 14:48:25 2012 +0100
@@ -38,6 +38,21 @@
  * for the best explanations of this ordering.
  */
 
+/*
+ * If a bitmap has a number of bits which is not a multiple of 8 then
+ * the last few bits of the last byte of the bitmap can be
+ * unexpectedly set which can confuse consumers (e.g. in the tools)
+ * who also round up their loops to 8 bits. Ensure we clear those left
+ * over bits so as to prevent surprises.
+ */
+static void clamp_last_byte(uint8_t *bp, int nbits)
+{
+       int remainder = nbits % 8;
+
+       if (remainder)
+               bp[nbits/8] &= ((1U<<remainder)-1);
+}
+
 int __bitmap_empty(const unsigned long *bitmap, int bits)
 {
        int k, lim = bits/BITS_PER_LONG;
@@ -485,6 +500,7 @@ void bitmap_long_to_byte(uint8_t *bp, co
                        nbits -= 8;
                }
        }
+       clamp_last_byte(bp, nbits);
 }
 
 void bitmap_byte_to_long(unsigned long *lp, const uint8_t *bp, int nbits)
@@ -507,6 +523,7 @@ void bitmap_byte_to_long(unsigned long *
 void bitmap_long_to_byte(uint8_t *bp, const unsigned long *lp, int nbits)
 {
        memcpy(bp, lp, (nbits+7)/8);
+       clamp_last_byte(bp, nbits);
 }
 
 void bitmap_byte_to_long(unsigned long *lp, const uint8_t *bp, int nbits)



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