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Re: [Xen-devel] Xen Security Advisory 11 (CVE-2012-3433) - HVM destroy p2m host DoS (Xen.org security team)


  • To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • From: "Andres Lagar-Cavilla" <andres@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2012 09:30:12 -0700
  • Cc: ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxx, tim@xxxxxxx, ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx, security@xxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 09 Aug 2012 16:30:49 +0000
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xen.org>

I realize Gridcentric is neither a service provider, nor a "big vendor",
and therefore not on the pre-disclosure list.

However, this is a bug on which we have first-hand knowledge and ability
to immediately mitigate. In fact, I wrote equivalent code for 4.2/unstable
months ago.

I ignored the xen-devel discussion on pre-disclosure list (my bad), but
understand now that there may be some use to Gridcentric being in that
list.

Thanks
Andres

>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
>             Xen Security Advisory CVE-2012-3433 / XSA-11
>                           version 3
>
>       HVM guest destroy p2m teardown host DoS vulnerability
>
> UPDATES IN VERSION 3
> ====================
>
> Embargo ended Thursday 2012-08-09 12:00:00 UTC.
>
> ISSUE DESCRIPTION
> =================
>
> An HVM guest is able to manipulate its physical address space such
> that tearing down the guest takes an extended period amount of
> time searching for shared pages.
>
> This causes the domain 0 VCPU which tears down the domain to be
> blocked in the destroy hypercall. This causes that domain 0 VCPU to
> become unavailable and may cause the domain 0 kernel to panic.
>
> There is no requirement for memory sharing to be in use.
>
> IMPACT
> ======
>
> A guest kernel can cause the host to become unresponsive for a period
> of time, potentially leading to a DoS.
>
> VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
> ==================
>
> All systems running HVM guests with untrusted guest kernels.
>
> This vulnerability effects only Xen 4.0 and 4.1. Xen 3.4 and earlier
> and xen-unstable are not vulnerable.
>
> MITIGATION
> ==========
>
> This issue can be mitigated by running PV (para-virtualised) guests
> only, or by ensuring (inside the guest) that the kernel is
> trustworthy.
>
> RESOLUTION
> ==========
>
> Applying the appropriate attached patch will resolve the issue.
>
> NOTE REGARDING CVE
> ==================
>
> We do not yet have a CVE Candidate number for this vulnerability.
>
> PATCH INFORMATION
> =================
>
> The attached patches resolve this issue
>
>  Xen 4.1, 4.1.x                              xsa11-4.1.patch
>  Xen 4.0, 4.0.x                              xsa11-4.0.patch
>
> $ sha256sum xsa11-*.patch
> c8ab767d831b20a1b22c69a28127303c89cf0379cbf6f1ba3acfda6240aa2a89
> xsa11-4.0.patch
> 61c6424023a26a8b4ea591d0bff6969908091a1a1e1304567d0d910908f21e8d
> xsa11-4.1.patch
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