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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V2] amd iommu: re-enable iommu msi if dom0 disabled it



On 06/20/2012 05:45 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
 > Rather than submitting it for inclusion immediately, I'd rather see
you first use it successfully. Below/attached what appears to
work fine for me in contrived situations (i.e. hiding bridges with
nothing connected, as I still don't have any AMD IOMMU system
at hand).

Hi Jan,

The patch works for me. IOMMU msi Capability is shown as enabled with this patch.
Thanks,
Wei

00:00.2 Generic system peripheral [0806]: Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] Device 1419
        Subsystem: Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] Device 1419
        Flags: bus master, fast devsel, latency 0, IRQ 11
        Capabilities: [40] Secure device <?>
        Capabilities: [54] MSI: Enable+ Count=1/1 Maskable- 64bit+
        Capabilities: [64] HyperTransport: MSI Mapping Enable+ Fixed+


Jan

Note that due to ptwr_do_page_fault() being run first, there'll be a
MEM_LOG() issued for each such attempt. If that's undesirable, the
order of the calls would need to be swapped.

--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -1875,6 +1875,7 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl
              break;
          case 1:
              l1e_remove_flags(nl1e, _PAGE_RW);
+            rc = 0;
              break;
          }
          if ( page )
@@ -5208,6 +5209,97 @@ int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, u
      return 0;
  }

+#ifdef __x86_64__
+/*************************
+ * fault handling for read-only MMIO pages
+ */
+
+struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt {
+    struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt;
+    unsigned long cr2;
+};
+
+static int mmio_ro_emulated_read(
+    enum x86_segment seg,
+    unsigned long offset,
+    void *p_data,
+    unsigned int bytes,
+    struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+    return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+}
+
+static int mmio_ro_emulated_write(
+    enum x86_segment seg,
+    unsigned long offset,
+    void *p_data,
+    unsigned int bytes,
+    struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+    struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt *mmio_ro_ctxt =
+        container_of(ctxt, struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt, ctxt);
+
+    /* Only allow naturally-aligned stores at the original %cr2 address. */
+    if ( ((bytes | offset)&  (bytes - 1)) || offset != mmio_ro_ctxt->cr2 )
+    {
+        MEM_LOG("mmio_ro_emulate: bad access (cr2=%lx, addr=%lx, bytes=%u)",
+                mmio_ro_ctxt->cr2, offset, bytes);
+        return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+    }
+
+    return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+}
+
+static const struct x86_emulate_ops mmio_ro_emulate_ops = {
+    .read       = mmio_ro_emulated_read,
+    .insn_fetch = ptwr_emulated_read,
+    .write      = mmio_ro_emulated_write,
+};
+
+/* Check if guest is trying to modify a r/o MMIO page. */
+int mmio_ro_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr,
+                          struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+{
+    l1_pgentry_t      pte;
+    unsigned long     mfn;
+    unsigned int      addr_size = is_pv_32on64_domain(v->domain) ?
+                                  32 : BITS_PER_LONG;
+    struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt mmio_ro_ctxt = {
+        .ctxt.regs = regs,
+        .ctxt.addr_size = addr_size,
+        .ctxt.sp_size = addr_size,
+        .cr2 = addr
+    };
+    int rc;
+
+    /* Attempt to read the PTE that maps the VA being accessed. */
+    guest_get_eff_l1e(v, addr,&pte);
+
+    /* We are looking only for read-only mappings of MMIO pages. */
+    if ( ((l1e_get_flags(pte)&  (_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW)) != _PAGE_PRESENT) )
+        return 0;
+
+    mfn = l1e_get_pfn(pte);
+    if ( mfn_valid(mfn) )
+    {
+        struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+        struct domain *owner = page_get_owner_and_reference(page);
+
+        if ( owner )
+            put_page(page);
+        if ( owner != dom_io )
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
+        return 0;
+
+    rc = x86_emulate(&mmio_ro_ctxt.ctxt,&mmio_ro_emulate_ops);
+
+    return rc != X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE ? EXCRET_fault_fixed : 0;
+}
+#endif /* __x86_64__ */
+
  void free_xen_pagetable(void *v)
  {
      if ( system_state == SYS_STATE_early_boot )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1349,20 +1349,23 @@ static int fixup_page_fault(unsigned lon
          return 0;
      }

-    if ( VM_ASSIST(d, VMASST_TYPE_writable_pagetables)&&
-         guest_kernel_mode(v, regs) )
-    {
-        unsigned int mbs = PFEC_write_access;
-        unsigned int mbz = PFEC_reserved_bit | PFEC_insn_fetch;
-
-        /* Do not check if access-protection fault since the page may
-           legitimately be not present in shadow page tables */
-        if ( !paging_mode_enabled(d) )
-            mbs |= PFEC_page_present;
-
-        if ( ((regs->error_code&  (mbs | mbz)) == mbs)&&
+    if ( guest_kernel_mode(v, regs)&&
+         !(regs->error_code&  (PFEC_reserved_bit | PFEC_insn_fetch))&&
+         (regs->error_code&  PFEC_write_access) )
+    {
+        if ( VM_ASSIST(d, VMASST_TYPE_writable_pagetables)&&
+             /* Do not check if access-protection fault since the page may
+                legitimately be not present in shadow page tables */
+             (paging_mode_enabled(d) ||
+              (regs->error_code&  PFEC_page_present))&&
               ptwr_do_page_fault(v, addr, regs) )
              return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+        if ( IS_PRIV(d)&&  (regs->error_code&  PFEC_page_present)&&
+             mmio_ro_do_page_fault(v, addr, regs) )
+            return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
+#endif
      }

      /* For non-external shadowed guests, we fix up both their own
@@ -1690,6 +1693,13 @@ static int pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *d,
          return 0;

      machine_bdf = (d->arch.pci_cf8>>  8)&  0xFFFF;
+    if ( write )
+    {
+        const unsigned long *ro_map = pci_get_ro_map(0);
+
+        if ( ro_map&&  test_bit(machine_bdf, ro_map) )
+            return 0;
+    }
      start = d->arch.pci_cf8&  0xFF;
      end = start + size - 1;
      if (xsm_pci_config_permission(d, machine_bdf, start, end, write))
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/pci.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/pci.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@

  #include<xen/spinlock.h>
  #include<xen/pci.h>
+#include<xen/init.h>
  #include<asm/io.h>

  #define PCI_CONF_ADDRESS(bus, dev, func, reg) \
@@ -70,3 +71,7 @@ void pci_conf_write32(
      BUG_ON((bus>  255) || (dev>  31) || (func>  7) || (reg>  255));
      pci_conf_write(PCI_CONF_ADDRESS(bus, dev, func, reg), 0, 4, data);
  }
+
+void __init arch_pci_ro_device(int seg, int bdf)
+{
+}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c
@@ -145,9 +145,30 @@ static void __iomem *mcfg_ioremap(const
      return (void __iomem *) virt;
  }

+void arch_pci_ro_device(int seg, int bdf)
+{
+    unsigned int idx, bus = PCI_BUS(bdf);
+
+    for (idx = 0; idx<  pci_mmcfg_config_num; ++idx) {
+        const struct acpi_mcfg_allocation *cfg = pci_mmcfg_virt[idx].cfg;
+        unsigned long mfn = (cfg->address>>  PAGE_SHIFT) + bdf;
+
+        if (!pci_mmcfg_virt[idx].virt || cfg->pci_segment != seg ||
+            cfg->start_bus_number>  bus || cfg->end_bus_number<  bus)
+            continue;
+
+        if (rangeset_add_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn))
+            printk(XENLOG_ERR
+                   "%04x:%02x:%02x.%u: could not mark MCFG (mfn %#lx) 
read-only\n",
+                   cfg->pci_segment, bus, PCI_SLOT(bdf), PCI_FUNC(bdf),
+                   mfn);
+    }
+}
+
  int pci_mmcfg_arch_enable(unsigned int idx)
  {
      const typeof(pci_mmcfg_config[0]) *cfg = pci_mmcfg_virt[idx].cfg;
+    const unsigned long *ro_map = pci_get_ro_map(cfg->pci_segment);

      if (pci_mmcfg_virt[idx].virt)
          return 0;
@@ -159,6 +180,16 @@ int pci_mmcfg_arch_enable(unsigned int i
      }
      printk(KERN_INFO "PCI: Using MCFG for segment %04x bus %02x-%02x\n",
             cfg->pci_segment, cfg->start_bus_number, cfg->end_bus_number);
+    if (ro_map) {
+        unsigned int bdf = PCI_BDF(cfg->start_bus_number, 0, 0);
+        unsigned int end = PCI_BDF(cfg->end_bus_number, -1, -1);
+
+        while ((bdf = find_next_bit(ro_map, end + 1, bdf))<= end) {
+            arch_pci_ro_device(cfg->pci_segment, bdf);
+            if (bdf++ == end)
+                break;
+        }
+    }
      return 0;
  }

--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_detect.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_detect.c
@@ -153,6 +153,12 @@ int __init amd_iommu_detect_one_acpi(
      if ( rt )
          return -ENODEV;

+    rt = pci_ro_device(iommu->seg, bus, PCI_DEVFN(dev, func));
+    if ( rt )
+        printk(XENLOG_ERR
+               "Could not mark config space of %04x:%02x:%02x.%u read-only 
(%d)\n",
+               iommu->seg, bus, dev, func, rt);
+
      list_add_tail(&iommu->list,&amd_iommu_head);

      return 0;
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c
@@ -593,11 +593,3 @@ void hvm_dpci_eoi(struct domain *d, unsi
  unlock:
      spin_unlock(&d->event_lock);
  }
-
-static int __init setup_mmio_ro_ranges(void)
-{
-    mmio_ro_ranges = rangeset_new(NULL, "r/o mmio ranges",
-                                  RANGESETF_prettyprint_hex);
-    return 0;
-}
-__initcall(setup_mmio_ro_ranges);
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
  struct pci_seg {
      struct list_head alldevs_list;
      u16 nr;
+    unsigned long *ro_map;
      /* bus2bridge_lock protects bus2bridge array */
      spinlock_t bus2bridge_lock;
  #define MAX_BUSES 256
@@ -106,6 +107,8 @@ void __init pt_pci_init(void)
      radix_tree_init(&pci_segments);
      if ( !alloc_pseg(0) )
          panic("Could not initialize PCI segment 0\n");
+    mmio_ro_ranges = rangeset_new(NULL, "r/o mmio ranges",
+                                  RANGESETF_prettyprint_hex);
  }

  int __init pci_add_segment(u16 seg)
@@ -113,6 +116,13 @@ int __init pci_add_segment(u16 seg)
      return alloc_pseg(seg) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
  }

+const unsigned long *pci_get_ro_map(u16 seg)
+{
+    struct pci_seg *pseg = get_pseg(seg);
+
+    return pseg ? pseg->ro_map : NULL;
+}
+
  static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct pci_seg *pseg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
  {
      struct pci_dev *pdev;
@@ -198,6 +208,33 @@ static void free_pdev(struct pci_seg *ps
      xfree(pdev);
  }

+int __init pci_ro_device(int seg, int bus, int devfn)
+{
+    struct pci_seg *pseg = alloc_pseg(seg);
+    struct pci_dev *pdev;
+
+    if ( !pseg )
+        return -ENOMEM;
+    pdev = alloc_pdev(pseg, bus, devfn);
+    if ( !pdev )
+        return -ENOMEM;
+
+    if ( !pseg->ro_map )
+    {
+        size_t sz = BITS_TO_LONGS(PCI_BDF(-1, -1, -1) + 1) * sizeof(long);
+
+        pseg->ro_map = alloc_xenheap_pages(get_order_from_bytes(sz), 0);
+        if ( !pseg->ro_map )
+            return -ENOMEM;
+        memset(pseg->ro_map, 0, sz);
+    }
+
+    __set_bit(PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn), pseg->ro_map);
+    arch_pci_ro_device(seg, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
  struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn)
  {
      struct pci_seg *pseg = get_pseg(seg);
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
@@ -555,6 +555,8 @@ void memguard_unguard_stack(void *p);

  int  ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *, unsigned long,
                          struct cpu_user_regs *);
+int  mmio_ro_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *, unsigned long,
+                           struct cpu_user_regs *);

  int audit_adjust_pgtables(struct domain *d, int dir, int noisy);

--- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -98,8 +98,11 @@ struct pci_dev *pci_lock_domain_pdev(
  void setup_dom0_pci_devices(struct domain *, void (*)(struct pci_dev *));
  void pci_release_devices(struct domain *d);
  int pci_add_segment(u16 seg);
+const unsigned long *pci_get_ro_map(u16 seg);
  int pci_add_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev_info *);
  int pci_remove_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
+int pci_ro_device(int seg, int bus, int devfn);
+void arch_pci_ro_device(int seg, int bdf);
  struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn);
  struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain(
      struct domain *, int seg, int bus, int devfn);




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