[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Security vulnerability process, and CVE-2012-0217
>>> On 20.06.12 at 11:45, George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 9:49 AM, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> On 19.06.12 at 20:16, Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> The most controversial decision was whether the embargo date might be >>> extended after it had originally been set. We resisted these >>> suggestions, referring to the process document, which does not >>> contemplate extending the disclosure period. However, when a >>> predisclosure list member pressured the discoverer into requesting an >>> extension, we felt the best interpretation of the process document >>> required us to acquiesce. >>> >>> Specifically, of course, we as a team would like clearer guidance from >>> the process about whether, and if so under what circumstances, a >>> predisclosure period should be extended. >> >> I think this should be done via (perhaps silent) consensus on the >> pre-discosure list. Leaving the embargo time line determination >> entirely to the discoverer isn't really suitable. He might provide an >> initial suggestion, but we ought to set a period of time (say, a >> week or less) during which adjustment proposals can be made. > > The problem with this is that extending the embargo helps providers > who are on the predisclosure list (a minority), but hurts those not on > the list (the vast majority). So there's a moral hazard with what you > suggest: it is just way too easy for the people on the list to vote to > make their own lives easier, not considering the plight of those who > are not big enough or connected enough to be on the list. Doing so > also favors large players and incumbents against small players; doing > so may well be considered anti-competitive and illegal in many > jurisdictions. > > The only way this would work is if the predisclosure list consisted > exclusively of software providers, and specifically excluded service > providers. It should be possible to include all software providers on > the list, since it's a relatively small number of entities. > Furthermore, since software providers presumably care about the > security of their customers, it would provide the incentive to make > the embargo as short as is reasonable. You need to take this in context with my proposal to have only software vendors have a vote here, and to allow service providers at most an observing (maybe recommending to a limited degree) role. >>> 3. Decisionmaking >>> >>> It was suggested to us several times, and indeed seemed to be regarded >>> by some as an underlying principle, that the predisclosure list >>> members should be making the decisions about disclosure schedule etc. >>> >>> The question of who is to make the decisions, and on what basis, needs >>> to be addressed. >> >> See above. Leaving this to the discretion of the discoverer is >> neither open nor fair. > > But there's a practical matter to consider here: if it's known that we > won't cooperate with the discoverer wrt disclosure times, discoverers > may simply not share their information with us. I think that's the > main reason for the "do what the discoverer wants" rule. I think > there needs to be some kind of a balance though: extending the embargo > less than 12 hours before the deadline is clearly not reasonable. I still suggested that the discoverer gets a first shot at the embargo deadline. But if everyone else disagrees (i.e. the deadline was unreasonable), then it should be possible to ignore the discoverer's preference. >>> Several members of the predisclosure list suggested that the >>> predisclosure period was too short. Others were ready within the >>> predisclosure period's timeframe, and were disappointed to see it >>> extended and to have to delay their fixes. >> >> Setting a default period might be counter productive. There may >> be cases (for example had we wanted to fix XSA-9 properly) >> where developing a fix could take quite a bit of time. Not having >> a fix ready shouldn't, however, prevent initial announcements of >> a problem. > > A default period can be considered a guideline. In the case of a > particularly tricky fix, saying, "Normally we would set 2 weeks, but I > think in this case we should go for 3 or 4" is perfectly reasonable. > > Since the embargo is really for software providers to test fixes, > perhaps we should suggest it should be "X business days after a fix is > released", rather than "X days after the vulnerability is disclosed"? Yes, that sounds like a reasonable thing. >> As to downstreams, I think only direct ones should be involved in >> any decision making processes. Indirect ones might be allowed on >> the list, but exclusively as observers. Mis-use of the observer role >> (e.g. as in influencing those participating in decision making in >> undue ways), should it become known, should result in removal of >> list membership. > > What do you mean by "direct" and "indirect"? If by "direct" you mean, > "sell/distribute software", and "indirect" you mean, "use the software > to provide a service", I think we're probably in agreement. :-) That's what I mean, and so we are apparently. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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