Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86-64: refine the XSA-9 fix

[Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>]

On 13/06/2012 11:04, "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Our product management wasn't happy with the "solution" for XSA-9, and
> demanded that customer systems must continue to boot. Rather than
> having our and perhaps other distros carry non-trivial patches, allow
> for more fine grained control (panic on boot, deny guest creation, or
> merely warn) by means of a single line change.

All this seems to allow is to boot but not create domU-s. Which seems a bit
pointless.

 -- Keir

> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> 
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
> @@ -32,8 +32,11 @@
>  static char opt_famrev[14];
>  string_param("cpuid_mask_cpu", opt_famrev);
>  
> -static bool_t opt_allow_unsafe;
> +#ifdef __x86_64__
> +/* 1 = allow, 0 = don't allow guest creation, -1 = don't allow boot */
> +s8 __read_mostly opt_allow_unsafe = -1;
>  boolean_param("allow_unsafe", opt_allow_unsafe);
> +#endif
>  
>  static inline void wrmsr_amd(unsigned int index, unsigned int lo,
> unsigned int hi)
> @@ -496,10 +499,19 @@ static void __devinit init_amd(struct cp
> clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_MWAIT, c->x86_capability);
>  
>  #ifdef __x86_64__
> - if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, AMD_ERRATUM_121) && !opt_allow_unsafe)
> + if (!cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, AMD_ERRATUM_121))
> +  opt_allow_unsafe = 1;
> + else if (opt_allow_unsafe < 0)
> panic("Xen will not boot on this CPU for security reasons.\n"
>      "Pass \"allow_unsafe\" if you're trusting all your"
>      " (PV) guest kernels.\n");
> + else if (!opt_allow_unsafe && c == &boot_cpu_data)
> +  printk(KERN_WARNING
> +         "*** Xen will not allow creation of DomU-s on"
> +         " this CPU for security reasons. ***\n"
> +         KERN_WARNING
> +         "*** Pass \"allow_unsafe\" if you're trusting"
> +         " all your (PV) guest kernels. ***\n");
>  
> /* AMD CPUs do not support SYSENTER outside of legacy mode. */
> clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, c->x86_capability);
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
> @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
>  #include <asm/traps.h>
>  #include <asm/nmi.h>
>  #include <asm/mce.h>
> +#include <asm/amd.h>
>  #include <xen/numa.h>
>  #include <xen/iommu.h>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> @@ -531,6 +532,20 @@ int arch_domain_create(struct domain *d,
>  
>  #else /* __x86_64__ */
>  
> +    if ( d->domain_id && !is_idle_domain(d) &&
> +         cpu_has_amd_erratum(&boot_cpu_data, AMD_ERRATUM_121) )
> +    {
> +        if ( !opt_allow_unsafe )
> +        {
> +            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "Xen does not allow DomU creation on this
> CPU"
> +                   " for security reasons.\n");
> +            return -EPERM;
> +        }
> +        printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> +               "Dom%d may compromise security on this CPU.\n",
> +               d->domain_id);
> +    }
> +
>      BUILD_BUG_ON(PDPT_L2_ENTRIES * sizeof(*d->arch.mm_perdomain_pt_pages)
>                   != PAGE_SIZE);
>      pg = alloc_domheap_page(NULL, MEMF_node(domain_to_node(d)));
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/amd.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/amd.h
> @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86;
>  int cpu_has_amd_erratum(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *, int, ...);
>  
>  #ifdef __x86_64__
> +extern s8 opt_allow_unsafe;
> +
>  void fam10h_check_enable_mmcfg(void);
>  void check_enable_amd_mmconf_dmi(void);
>  #endif
> 
> 
> 
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> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel



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