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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3 of 6] x86/mm/shadow: fix potential p2m/paging deadlock when emulating page table writes



Nack, at least for now; we spent a fair amount of effort taking all this
emulation code out from under the shadow lock; serializing it under the
p2m lock would be unfortunate.  The other patches are less worrying,
since they wrap a shadow_lock() in a p2m_lock() but I hope they can all
be avoided. 

The existing interlock between the shadow code and the p2m code prevents
any p2m modifications from happening when the shadow lock is held, so I
hope I can solve this by switching to unlocked lookups instead.  I'm
building a test kernel now to tell me exactly which lookps are to
blame.

If I don't get this done today I'll look into it tomorrow.  

Cheers,

Tim.

At 12:22 -0400 on 13 Apr (1334319741), Andres Lagar-Cavilla wrote:
>  xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c |  25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andres@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> diff -r f8fd4a4239a8 -r 964c6cbad926 xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
> @@ -5033,9 +5033,21 @@ sh_x86_emulate_write(struct vcpu *v, uns
>      if ( (vaddr & (bytes - 1)) && !is_hvm_vcpu(v)  )
>          return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
>  
> +    /* To prevent a shadow mode deadlock, we need to hold the p2m from here
> +     * onwards. emulate_unmap_dest may need to verify the pte that is being
> +     * written to here, and thus get_gfn on the gfn contained in the payload
> +     * that is being written here. p2m_lock is recursive, so all is well on
> +     * that regard. Further, holding the p2m lock ensures the page table gfn
> +     * being written to won't go away (although that could be achieved with
> +     * a page reference, as done elsewhere).
> +     */
> +    p2m_lock(p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain));
>      addr = emulate_map_dest(v, vaddr, bytes, sh_ctxt);
>      if ( emulate_map_dest_failed(addr) )
> +    {
> +        p2m_unlock(p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain));
>          return (long)addr;
> +    }
>  
>      paging_lock(v->domain);
>      memcpy(addr, src, bytes);
> @@ -5059,6 +5071,7 @@ sh_x86_emulate_write(struct vcpu *v, uns
>      emulate_unmap_dest(v, addr, bytes, sh_ctxt);
>      shadow_audit_tables(v);
>      paging_unlock(v->domain);
> +    p2m_unlock(p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain));
>      return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>  }
>  
> @@ -5075,9 +5088,14 @@ sh_x86_emulate_cmpxchg(struct vcpu *v, u
>      if ( (vaddr & (bytes - 1)) && !is_hvm_vcpu(v)  )
>          return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
>  
> +    /* see comment in sh_x86_emulate_write. */
> +    p2m_lock(p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain));
>      addr = emulate_map_dest(v, vaddr, bytes, sh_ctxt);
>      if ( emulate_map_dest_failed(addr) )
> +    {
> +        p2m_unlock(p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain));
>          return (long)addr;
> +    }
>  
>      paging_lock(v->domain);
>      switch ( bytes )
> @@ -5101,6 +5119,7 @@ sh_x86_emulate_cmpxchg(struct vcpu *v, u
>      emulate_unmap_dest(v, addr, bytes, sh_ctxt);
>      shadow_audit_tables(v);
>      paging_unlock(v->domain);
> +    p2m_unlock(p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain));
>      return rv;
>  }
>  
> @@ -5119,9 +5138,14 @@ sh_x86_emulate_cmpxchg8b(struct vcpu *v,
>      if ( (vaddr & 7) && !is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
>          return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
>  
> +    /* see comment in sh_x86_emulate_write. */
> +    p2m_lock(p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain));
>      addr = emulate_map_dest(v, vaddr, 8, sh_ctxt);
>      if ( emulate_map_dest_failed(addr) )
> +    {
> +        p2m_unlock(p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain));
>          return (long)addr;
> +    }
>  
>      old = (((u64) old_hi) << 32) | (u64) old_lo;
>      new = (((u64) new_hi) << 32) | (u64) new_lo;
> @@ -5135,6 +5159,7 @@ sh_x86_emulate_cmpxchg8b(struct vcpu *v,
>      emulate_unmap_dest(v, addr, 8, sh_ctxt);
>      shadow_audit_tables(v);
>      paging_unlock(v->domain);
> +    p2m_unlock(p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain));
>      return rv;
>  }
>  #endif
> 
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