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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4 of 9] Rework locking in the PoD layer



All righty, I'll include George from now on.

The chunk at the bottom was an irrelevant refactor. I'l repost without it

Good point on the asserts. I'll come up with some constructs that are
forwards-compatible with the fin-grained case. e.g:
(ASSERT(p2m_gfn_locked_by_me(p2m, gfn))

Andres

> At 00:33 -0400 on 27 Oct (1319675629), Andres Lagar-Cavilla wrote:
>> The PoD layer has a fragile locking discipline. It relies on the
>> p2m being globally locked, and it also relies on the page alloc
>> lock to protect some of its data structures. Replace this all by an
>> explicit pod lock: per p2m, order enforced.
>>
>> Two consequences:
>>     - Critical sections in the pod code protected by the page alloc
>>       lock are now reduced to modifications of the domain page list.
>>     - When the p2m lock becomes fine-grained, there are no
>>       assumptions broken in the PoD layer.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andres@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> The bulk of this looks OK to me, but will definitely need an Ack from
> George Dunlap as well.  Two comments:
>
>> diff -r 332775f72a30 -r 981073d78f7f xen/arch/x86/mm/mm-locks.h
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mm-locks.h
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mm-locks.h
>> @@ -155,6 +155,15 @@ declare_mm_lock(p2m)
>>  #define p2m_unlock(p)         mm_unlock(&(p)->lock)
>>  #define p2m_locked_by_me(p)   mm_locked_by_me(&(p)->lock)
>>
>> +/* PoD lock (per-p2m-table)
>> + *
>> + * Protects private PoD data structs. */
>> +
>> +declare_mm_lock(pod)
>> +#define pod_lock(p)           mm_lock(pod, &(p)->pod.lock)
>> +#define pod_unlock(p)         mm_unlock(&(p)->pod.lock)
>> +#define pod_locked_by_me(p)   mm_locked_by_me(&(p)->pod.lock)
>
> Can the explanatory comment be more explicit about what it covers? It is
> everything in the struct pod or just the page-lists that were mentioned
> in the comment you removed from p2m.h?
>
>> @@ -841,7 +854,6 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2
>>              if( *(map[i]+j) != 0 )
>>                  break;
>>
>> -        unmap_domain_page(map[i]);
>>
>>          /* See comment in p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage() re gnttab
>>           * check timing.  */
>> @@ -849,8 +861,15 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2
>>          {
>>              set_p2m_entry(p2m, gfns[i], mfns[i], PAGE_ORDER_4K,
>>                  types[i], p2m->default_access);
>> +            unmap_domain_page(map[i]);
>> +            map[i] = NULL;
>>          }
>> -        else
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    /* Finally, add to cache */
>> +    for ( i=0; i < count; i++ )
>> +    {
>> +        if ( map[i] )
>>          {
>>              if ( tb_init_done )
>>              {
>> @@ -867,6 +886,8 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2
>>                  __trace_var(TRC_MEM_POD_ZERO_RECLAIM, 0, sizeof(t),
>> &t);
>>              }
>>
>> +            unmap_domain_page(map[i]);
>> +
>>              /* Add to cache, and account for the new p2m PoD entry */
>>              p2m_pod_cache_add(p2m, mfn_to_page(mfns[i]),
>> PAGE_ORDER_4K);
>>              p2m->pod.entry_count++;
>
> That seems to be reshuffling the running order of this function but I
> don't see how it's related to locking.  Is this an unrelated change
> that snuck in?
>
> (Oh, a third thing just occurred to me - might be worth making some of
> those 'lock foo held on entry' comments into ASSERT(lock_held_by_me()). )
>
> Cheers,
>
> Tim.
>



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