[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Re: Bug#642154: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8803bb6ad000
On Tue, 2011-09-20 at 14:20 +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote: > On Tue, 2011-09-20 at 10:12 +0400, rush wrote: > > Hi, > > > > There are several Not tainted lines in old messages file. There are all of > > them: > > > > Sep 10 22:35:33 xen-dom0 kernel: [24183.985513] Pid: 2605, comm: > > debootstrap Not tainted 3.0.0-1-amd64 #1 Intel Corporation > > S1200BTL/S1200BTL > > Sep 10 22:35:33 xen-dom0 kernel: [24183.985621] RIP: > > e030:[<ffffffff810106db>] [<ffffffff810106db>] > > __sanitize_i387_state+0x23/0xe1 > > Source/disassembly: > > void __sanitize_i387_state(struct task_struct *tsk) > { > u64 xstate_bv; > int feature_bit = 0x2; > struct i387_fxsave_struct *fx = &tsk->thread.fpu.state->fxsave; > ffffffff810106b8: 48 8b 97 48 04 00 00 mov 0x448(%rdi),%rdx > > if (!fx) > return; > ffffffff810106bf: 48 85 d2 test %rdx,%rdx > ffffffff810106c2: 0f 84 d0 00 00 00 je 0xffffffff81010798 > > BUG_ON(task_thread_info(tsk)->status & TS_USEDFPU); > ffffffff810106c8: 48 8b 47 08 mov 0x8(%rdi),%rax > ffffffff810106cc: f6 40 14 01 testb $0x1,0x14(%rax) > ffffffff810106d0: 74 02 je 0xffffffff810106d4 > ffffffff810106d2: 0f 0b ud2 > > xstate_bv = tsk->thread.fpu.state->xsave.xsave_hdr.xstate_bv; > ffffffff810106db: 48 8b b2 00 02 00 00 mov 0x200(%rdx),%rsi > > So tsk->thread.fpu.state in RDX seems to be invalid. > > > Sep 10 22:35:33 xen-dom0 kernel: [24183.985716] RSP: > > e02b:ffff8803bd2c5e00 EFLAGS: 00010246 > > Sep 10 22:35:33 xen-dom0 kernel: [24183.985767] RAX: 0000000000000000 > > RBX: 00007fff3d69ecc0 RCX: 0000000000000200 > > Sep 10 22:35:33 xen-dom0 kernel: [24183.985824] RDX: ffff8803be0e8e00 > > RSI: ffff8803bd2c5fd8 RDI: ffff8803bd65aa30 > [...] > > RDX looks like a reasonable kernel memory pointer. Given the hostname, > I assume this kernel is running under Xen. So could this be a > use-after-free where the freed page has been unmapped for reallocation > by the hypervisor? Can that happen to arbitrary pages in the dom0 > kernel? In a modern pvops kernel there is a tendency towards leaving a page of actual dom0 memory behind in these cases, rather than a hole. A page with no backing mfn should never be escaping into the "wild" anyway but it's possible fir a given process to see one if it is doing hypercall activities, mapping foreign pages etc. There's been some similar looking threads on xen-devel recently but I haven't paid attention to the details, list & Konrad CC'd. Full log is at http://bugs.debian.org/642154. > > Ben. > -- Ian Campbell Everybody has something to conceal. -- Humphrey Bogart _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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