[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Re: [PATCH] Fix cpu online/offline bug: mce memory leak.
On 01/03/2011 10:12, "Haitao Shan" <maillists.shan@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hi, Keir, > > Fixing memory leak would be always good. But I don't agree this could fix the > problem I observed. > Yes, indeed, I observed the issue during stress test of cpu offline/online by > offlining all cpus except CPU0 one by one and then bringing them back. In this > case, with memory leak, after some time, xmalloc at onlining could hit a heap > page that is formerly owned by domains, since usable Xen heap memory will be > slowly used up. Without memory leak, xmalloc at onlining will be likely use > the memory that is freed just by offlining. So it won't trigger this > assertion. > > But let us think a typical usage model, you will offline all LPs on a socket > so that it can be later removed physically. Some other time, you will bring > them back. Between offlining and onlining, there could be a time interval as > long as one week and activities such as creating and killing many guests. How > can we ensure that we won't meet this assertion at that time? > > It is my understanding that this memory leak triggered the issue I raised but > the issue itself can be triggered in many other ways. Please do correct me if > I am wrong. Thanks! The point is that the patch also moves the xmalloc() calls out of the new CPU's bringup path, and into CPU_UP_PREPARE context. This means the allocations will occur on a different CPU, before the new CPU begins execution, and with irqs enabled. That's why it should fix your crash. -- Keir > Shan Haitao > > 2011/3/1 Keir Fraser <keir.xen@xxxxxxxxx> >> Some comments inline below. Overall a good patch to have, but needs some >> minor adjustments! >> >> -- Keir >> >> On 01/03/2011 09:09, "Liu, Jinsong" <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >>> Fix cpu online/offline bug: mce memory leak. >>> >>> Current Xen mce logic didn't free mcabanks. This would be a memory leak when >>> cpu offline. >>> When repeatly do cpu online/offline, this memory leak would make xenpool >>> shrink, and at a time point, >>> will call alloc_heap_pages --> flush_area_mask, which >>> ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled()). >>> However, cpu online is irq disable, so it finally result in Xen crash. >>> >>> This patch fix the memory leak bug, and tested OK over 110,000 round cpu >>> online/offline. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> >>> >>> diff -r 1a364b17d66a xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c Fri Feb 25 01:26:01 2011 +0800 >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c Mon Feb 28 19:19:20 2011 +0800 >>> @@ -1227,9 +1227,24 @@ static void intel_init_mce(void) >>> mce_uhandler_num = sizeof(intel_mce_uhandlers)/sizeof(struct >>> mca_error_handler); >>> } >>> >>> -static int intel_init_mca_banks(void) >>> +static void cpu_mcabank_free(unsigned int cpu) >>> { >>> - struct mca_banks *mb1, *mb2, * mb3; >>> + struct mca_banks *mb1, *mb2, *mb3, *mb4; >>> + >>> + mb1 = per_cpu(mce_clear_banks, cpu); >>> + mb2 = per_cpu(no_cmci_banks, cpu); >>> + mb3 = per_cpu(mce_banks_owned, cpu); >>> + mb4 = per_cpu(poll_bankmask, cpu); >>> + >>> + mcabanks_free(mb1); >>> + mcabanks_free(mb2); >>> + mcabanks_free(mb3); >>> + mcabanks_free(mb4); >>> +} >>> + >>> +static void cpu_mcabank_alloc(unsigned int cpu) >>> +{ >>> + struct mca_banks *mb1, *mb2, *mb3; >>> >>> mb1 = mcabanks_alloc(); >>> mb2 = mcabanks_alloc(); >>> @@ -1237,22 +1252,23 @@ static int intel_init_mca_banks(void) >>> if (!mb1 || !mb2 || !mb3) >>> goto out; >>> >>> - __get_cpu_var(mce_clear_banks) = mb1; >>> - __get_cpu_var(no_cmci_banks) = mb2; >>> - __get_cpu_var(mce_banks_owned) = mb3; >>> + per_cpu(mce_clear_banks, cpu) = mb1; >>> + per_cpu(no_cmci_banks, cpu) = mb2; >>> + per_cpu(mce_banks_owned, cpu) = mb3; >>> + return; >>> >>> - return 0; >>> out: >>> mcabanks_free(mb1); >>> mcabanks_free(mb2); >>> mcabanks_free(mb3); >>> - return -ENOMEM; >>> } >>> >>> /* p4/p6 family have similar MCA initialization process */ >>> enum mcheck_type intel_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) >>> { >>> - if (intel_init_mca_banks()) >>> + if ( !this_cpu(mce_clear_banks) || >>> + !this_cpu(no_cmci_banks) || >>> + !this_cpu(mce_banks_owned) ) >>> return mcheck_none; >>> >>> intel_init_mca(c); >>> @@ -1301,13 +1317,19 @@ static int cpu_callback( >>> static int cpu_callback( >>> struct notifier_block *nfb, unsigned long action, void *hcpu) >>> { >>> + unsigned int cpu = (unsigned long)hcpu; >>> + >>> switch ( action ) >>> { >>> + case CPU_UP_PREPARE: >>> + cpu_mcabank_alloc(cpu); >>> + break; >>> case CPU_DYING: >>> cpu_mcheck_disable(); >>> break; >>> case CPU_DEAD: >>> cpu_mcheck_distribute_cmci(); >>> + cpu_mcabank_free(cpu); >>> break; >> >> You also need to cpu_mcabank_free(cpu) on CPU_UP_CANCELED. Else there's a >> memory leak on failed CPU bringup. >> >>> default: >>> break; >>> @@ -1322,6 +1344,8 @@ static struct notifier_block cpu_nfb = { >>> >>> static int __init intel_mce_initcall(void) >>> { >>> + void *hcpu = (void *)(long)smp_processor_id(); >>> + cpu_callback(&cpu_nfb, CPU_UP_PREPARE, hcpu); >>> register_cpu_notifier(&cpu_nfb); >>> return 0; >>> } >>> diff -r 1a364b17d66a xen/arch/x86/setup.c >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c Fri Feb 25 01:26:01 2011 +0800 >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c Mon Feb 28 19:19:20 2011 +0800 >>> @@ -1203,6 +1203,8 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb >>> >>> arch_init_memory(); >>> >>> + do_presmp_initcalls(); >>> + >>> identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data); >>> if ( cpu_has_fxsr ) >>> set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_OSFXSR); >>> @@ -1235,8 +1237,6 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb >>> initialize_keytable(); >>> >>> console_init_postirq(); >>> - >>> - do_presmp_initcalls(); >> >> This looks risky, especially so close to 4.1 release. Instead of moving >> do_presmp_initcalls(), please special-case cpu_mcabank_alloc() for CPU0 in >> intel_mcheck_init(), and remove your direct call to >> cpu_callback(...CPU_UP_PREPARE...) in intel_mce_initcall(). >> >>> for_each_present_cpu ( i ) >>> { >> >> > > _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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