[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xen-devel] Re: xen crash in tmem: checking a xen pfn for domain ownership



Gfn_to_mfn() takes a domain as a parameter. It looks up gfn in that domain's
p2m. The only RAM-typed pfns that can be present in a domain's p2m, if it is
not sharing pages via memshr, are the domain's own pages. As far as I know,
at least. It does no harm for you to switch to gfn_to_mfn_unshare(), but I
doubt this is the fix for your current problem.

 -- Keir

On 17/09/2010 17:48, "Dan Magenheimer" <dan.magenheimer@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Thanks for the reply, but I'm not sure I understand.
> 
> Ignore memory sharing for now...
> 
> Are you saying, yes, the ownership check IS performed?
> E.g. if gpfn is a random number, NULL will always be
> returned (unless of course the random number happens
> to be a valid gfn for current->domain)?
> 
> Or are you saying its plausible that this IS the problem
> (that I am not checking for ownership)?
> 
> Now bring memory sharing back in...
> 
> Since tmem and memory sharing are supposed to be complementary
> (though I don't think anybody has ever tried using both
> together), are you saying I should change this one
> call from gfn_to_mfn() to gfn_to_mfn_unshare() for
> some reason (e.g. maybe to avoid a race)?  Note
> that this code is just getting a virtual address
> to copy a page to/from the guest.
> 
> Thanks,
> Dan
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Keir Fraser [mailto:keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
>> Sent: Friday, September 17, 2010 10:35 AM
>> To: Dan Magenheimer; Jan Beulich
>> Cc: Xen-devel
>> Subject: Re: xen crash in tmem: checking a xen pfn for domain ownership
>> 
>> If you could be doing memory sharing then you might need to use
>> gfn_to_mfn_unshare()? Otherwise it looks pretty plausible, and that one
>> flaw
>> is pretty minor as you're probably not using memshr.
>> 
>>  -- Keir
>> 
>> On 17/09/2010 17:29, "Dan Magenheimer" <dan.magenheimer@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> Does the construct:
>>> 
>>>   xen_pfn_t gpfn;
>>>   p2m_type_t t;
>>>   unsigned long mfn;
>>> 
>>>   mfn = mfn_x(gfn_to_mfn(current->domain, gpfn, &t));
>>>   if (t != p2m_ram_rw || cli_mfn == INVALID_MFN)
>>>       return NULL; /* bad */
>>>   return map_domain_page(mfn)
>>> 
>>> somehow check to ensure that pfn belongs to current->domain?
>>> (See cli_mfn_to_va() in common/tmem_xen.c.)
>>> 
>>> If not, is there an easy way to perform that check?
>>> (preferably one that works for both HVM and PV guests)
>>> 
>>> In debugging a tmem Linux-side guest patch, I discovered
>>> that a bad mfn passed by the guest can crash Xen and
>>> I think this assumption might be the problem.
>>> 
>>> Thanks,
>>> Dan
>> 
>> 



_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel


 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.