[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] HVM guests are allowed to use the entire virtual address space for
Put another way, I'd rather ASSERT(!is_hvm_vcpu(current)) than further reinforce the current confusion around these macros by supporting an obsolete usage. -- Keir On 25/05/2010 16:04, "Keir Fraser" <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > I think this is already handled correctly by guest_access.h, which is what > really matters. Nowadays copy_{to,from}_user (but not __copy_{to,from}_user) > are mainly for private usage only by the guest-access macros, and just a few > other arch-dependent PV_specific bits of code. Of course the __ versions are > still generally useful as 'copy but catch any fault' functions. > > -- Keir > > On 25/05/2010 15:49, "Tim Deegan" <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> whatever they want, without any Xen hole. __addr_ok() is therefore >> always true for such guests. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx> >> >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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