[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] VT-d: improve RMRR validity checking
Hi, > No, we cannot ignore it if iommu=force. The invisible device may be > disabled, not really non-existent. it is possibly that it is re-enabled > by malfunctional s/w. So when iommu=force, we should not ignore any > DRHD. We ignores it just to workaround the BIOS issue you encountered. OK, I return to the same question as Pasi asked. You mean even ignoring the DRHD that has no existent devices is insecure, right? In other word, iommu=1 might be insecure while working with workaround. We might have to consider security and BIOS workaround separately. I believe default action must be secure and enabled with strictly checked values. If "force" or some workaround options (e.g ignore_bogus_rmrr, ignore_bogus_drhd, force_enable_with_bogus_drhd, ...) specified, VT-d enabled with some special workaround, with uncertain values, but these mode should be considered "not always secure". What do you think? Regards, Noboru. Noboru Iwamatsu wrote:Weidong, I read the patch and the following thread. I understood what you mean, but I think it's better to limit the scope of "force_iommu". And I believe RMRR should be checked as same as DRHD. What I thought about DRHD is: If all devices under the scope of the DRHD are non-existent, this DRHD is invalid but safely ignorable, so ignore it.No, we cannot ignore it if iommu=force. The invisible device may be disabled, not really non-existent. it is possibly that it is re-enabled by malfunctional s/w. So when iommu=force, we should not ignore any DRHD. We ignores it just to workaround the BIOS issue you encountered.If some devices under the scope of the DRHD are non-existent, this DRHD is invalid, so disable VT-d unless "iommu=force" option is specified. When "iommu=force" option is specified, even the invalid DRHD will be registered, because DRHD that has some existent devices must not be ignored due to security reasons. About the RMRR: If all devices under the scope of the RMRR are non-existent, this RMMR is invalid but ignorable, so ignore it. If some devices under the scope of the RMRR are non-existent, this RMRR is invalid, so disable VT-d unless "iommu=force"RMRR is much different from DRHD, it's just reversed memories for specific devices (now only Intel IGD and USB contollers need RMRR), it's no security issue like described above. if "all" devices under the scope of the RMRR are non-existent, we can ignore the RMRR because no devices will use it. if some" devices under the scope of the RMRR are non-existent, we cannot ignore the RMRR, because there are still some devices want to use it. I think we needn't to disable VT-d because it won't cause any issues. Of course, we also can disable VT-d for this case strictly.option is specified. When "iommu=force" option is specified, the invalid RMRR is ignored (it's safe). I attach the patch. What do you think?Noboru, I think it need not to change current code. BTW, your patch is not based on latest Xen. Regards, WeidongRegards, Noboru.I implemented a patch and attached. patch description: In order to make Xen more defensive to VT-d related BIOS issue, this patch ignores a DRHD if all devices under its scope are not pci discoverable, and regards a DRHD as invalid and then disable whole VT-d if some devices under its scope are not pci discoverable. But if iommu=force is set, it will enable all DRHDs reported by BIOS, to avoid any security vulnerability with malicious s/s re-enabling "supposed disabled" devices. Pls note that we don't know the devices under the "Include_all" DRHD are existent or not, because the scope of "Include_all" DRHD won't enumerate common pci device, it only enumerates I/OxAPIC and HPET devices. Signed-off-by: Noboru Iwamatsu <n_iwamatsu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@xxxxxxxxx> Noboru, pls test the patch on your machine? Joe, could you review the patch? and pls ACK it if it's fine for you. Regards, Weidong Noboru Iwamatsu wrote:Thanks, I understood.Noboru Iwamatsu wrote:Hi Weidong, I'm not sure why the security problem is caused by ignoring the DRHD that has only non-existent devices. Could you explain details or where to read the spec?It's requested from security experts. The device that is not pci discoverable may be re-enabled by malicious software. If its DRHD is not enabled, the re-enabled device is not protected by VT-d. It will cause security issue.As you saying, security is the top-priority. However, when iommu=force is specified, we should enable vt-d if there are some potential issues. Because users want to "force" anyway.iommu=force was introduced to enable VT-d anyway for security purpose. I plan to still enable those DRHDs that includes non-existed device when iommu=force, otherwise ignore them. Regards, WeidongRegards, Noboru.Keir Fraser wrote:If we want to keep iommu=1 as default, then it is unacceptable to fail to boot on a fairly wide range of modern systems. We have to warn-and-disable, partially or completely, unless iommu=force is specified. Or we need to revert to iommu=0 as the default. What do you think, Weidong?Yes. I agree to warn-and-disable for these BIOS issues, and consider security more when iommu=force. Therefore I will implement a patch based on Nororu's patch. Regards, Weidong-- Keir On 21/01/2010 14:17, "Sander Eikelenboom" <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:Hello Weidong, The problem is most vendor's just don't fix it and ignore the problem completely. Most often hiding them selves behind: come back when it's a problem with Microsoft Windows, that the only single thing we support (and no other software, so no vmware, no xen, no linux, perhaps even no hypervisor) Well I don't know if the virtual pc in windows 7 supports an iommu now, but it didn't in the past as far as i know, so any complain bounces off, and there it all seems to end for them. Besides that i don't know if they do know what the problems with there implementation in BIOS is when someone reports it. I think some behind the scenes pressure from Intel to vendors might help to solve some of them. (my Q35 chipset, "Intel V-PRO" marketed motherboard (so much for that) also suffers RMRR problem when another graphics card is inserted which switches off the IGD). Although i think in my case your patch will work around that for me. Perhaps a third option is needed, which does all the workarounds possible and warns about potential security problem when requested ? -- Sander Thursday, January 21, 2010, 1:46:39 PM, you wrote:Noboru Iwamatsu wrote:Hi Weidong, I re-send the DRHD-fix patch. If DRHD does not have existent devices, ignore it. If DRHD has both existent and non-existent devices, consider it invalid and not register.Although you patch workarounds your buggy BIOS, but we still need to enable it for security purpose as I mentioned in previous mail. We needn't workaround / fix all BIOS issues in software. I think security is more important for this specific BIOS issue. Did you report the BIOS issue to your OEM vendor? maybe it's better to get it fixed in BIOS. Regards, WeidongAccording to this patch and yours, my machine successfully booted with vt-d enabled. Signed-off-by: Noboru Iwamatsu <n_iwamatsu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>Keir Fraser wrote:On 21/01/2010 10:19, "Weidong Han" <weidong.han@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:Sorry this is typo. I mean: So, I think RMRR that has no-existent device is "invalid" and whole RMRR should be ignored.looks reasonable. Keir, I Acks Noboru's rmrr patch. Or do you want us to merge them to one patch?Merge them up, re-send with both sign-off and acked-by all in one email. Thanks, KeirSorry, I disagree with Noboru after thinking it again. If the RMRR has both no-existent device and also has existent devices in its scope, we should not ignore it because the existent devices under its scope will be impacted without the RMRR. so I suggest to print a warning instead of ignore it. Attached a patch for it. Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@xxxxxxxxx> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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