[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] RE: [Xen-devel] mce_wrmsr() and (at least) HVM guests
Jan, sorry for no response for this. It is not in my inbox, maybe is put into my junkmail box. (Really strange that some xen-devel mail will be put into junkmail, including my patch submission mail). I think it is different for MCG_CTL and MCn_CTL: For MCG_CTL, the SDM spec stated: "IA32_MCG_CTL controls the reporting of machine-check exceptions. If present, writing 1s to this register enables machine-check features and writing all 0s disables machine-check features. All other values are undefined and/or implementation specific.". So I assume current implementation is ok. For MCn_CTL, the spec only stated that "P6 family processors only allow the writing of all 1s or all 0s to the IA32_MCi_CTL MSR". So yes, current implementation is over-killed, especially I think we should not care about P6 family in Xen environment. But the mce_cpu_quirks() give remind me if we should still split the Intel/AMD MCE msr virtualization? For example, will AMD platform allow IA32_MCE_CTL to be not all 1s and 0s? And also another potential issue raised out. For example, guest has clear one bit in MCn_CTL while physically it is enabled. If a error corresponding to this bit really happen, at least we should not inject a vMCE to guest. We will either kill the guest, or let the guest continues, depends on the error type . I can cook patches for these issues, after I resolve the vMCE to pvops dom0, hopefully early next week. --jyh >-----Original Message----- >From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxxxx] >Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2009 9:03 PM >To: Ke, Liping; Jiang, Yunhong >Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx >Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] mce_wrmsr() and (at least) HVM guests > >>>> "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxxxx> 01.12.09 12:19 >>> >>With mce_wrmsr() not permitting to write other than all zeroes or all ones >>to MCG_CTL and MCn_CTL, it is not possible for guests to implement >>workarounds (see the one in mce_cpu_quirks() which has been present in >>Linux versions for a very long time). While one could expect PV guests to >>be aware of that (and avoid the workaround), HVM guests clearly can't >>be expected to. Thus the question is whether the handling should be >>made a little more permissive. >> >>Initially I had thought of just making Xen check whether the bit(s) in >>question are also off in the physical MSR, but that would imply that >>Xen always has implemented at least all of the workarounds any guest >>may know of. I'm not sure I have a good other idea, short of allowing >>all writes to succeed. > >Ping? > >Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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