From:
dinesh_chan8@xxxxxxxxxxxTo:
michal@xxxxxxxxxSubject: RE: [Xen-devel] Academic Project
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 00:46:01 +0530
Essentially, first step towards minimizing the trusted computing base.
Assuming the VMM is not compromised (after a secure boot), domU doesnt have to trust dom0.
For example, the following command issued from dom0 would dump the guest memory in dom0 hard disk,
xm save Guest guest_mem.dump
Using the crypto coprocessor, this can be encrypted, so that only domU can read/write and not dom0.
The result of the above command will store an encrypted dump file on the dom0 disk.
Thanks,
Dinesh C
From:
michal@xxxxxxxxxTo:
dinesh_chan8@xxxxxxxxxxxSubject: Re: [Xen-devel] Academic Project
Date: Sun, 22 Feb 2009 19:31:32 +0100
And what is the purpose of this?
Seems to be trivial to get over it.
Sent from my iPhone
Hi Folks,
I'm developing a secure memory manager module for xen as a part of my academic project.
Thereby protecting DomU memory by moving the trust for memory protection from Dom0 to hardware by encrypting/
decrypting the guest memory on per-domain-secret key basis and realizing the same using a crypto coprocessor (FPGA)
with necessary software (XEN) hooks and interfaces.
Now one of the implementation issues is that how to move the domU memory allocation (both boot pages and application pages)
to fall behind the coprocessor by modifying xen source. If so where in the source tree the changes have to be made.
I did try modifying common/memory.c : populate_physmap(), but I am afraid this is not the right place.
Since I have allocate real memory to domU, I am clueless.
I would appreciate you If you could send me your valuable suggestions.
Thanks,
Dinesh C
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