[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] RE: [Xen-devel] Re: [RFC] RAS(Part II)--MCA enalbing in XEN
Frank/Christopher, can you please give more comments for it, or you are OK with this? For the action reporting mechanism, we will send out a proposal for review soon. Thanks Yunhong Jiang Jiang, Yunhong <> wrote: > Christopher/Frank, thanks for reply very much, see comments below. > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Frank.Vanderlinden@xxxxxxx [mailto:Frank.Vanderlinden@xxxxxxx] Sent: >> 2009年2月26日 1:33 To: Christoph Egger >> Cc: Jiang, Yunhong; Kleen, Andi; >> xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Keir Fraser; Ke, Liping; Gavin Maltby >> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Re: [RFC] RAS(Part II)--MCA enalbing in XEN >> >> Christoph Egger wrote: >>> On Wednesday 25 February 2009 03:25:12 Jiang, Yunhong wrote: >>> >>>> So, Frank/Egger, can I assume followed are consensus currently? >>>> >>>> 1) MCE is handled by Xen HV totally, while guest's vMCE handler will >>>> only works for itself. 2) Xen present a virtual #MC to guest through MSR >>>> access emulation.(Xen will do the translation if needed). >>>> 3) Guest's unmodified >>>> MCE handler will handle the vMCE injected. >>>> 4) Dom0 will get all log/telemetry through hypercall. >>>> 5) The action taken by xen will be passed to dom0 through the telemetry >>>> mechanism. >>> >>> Mostly. Regarding 2) I want like to discuss first how to handle errors >>> impacting multiple contiguous physical pages which are non-contigous >>> in guest physical space. > > >>> >>> And I also want to discuss about how to do recovery actions requiring >>> PCI access. One example for this is >>> Shanghai's "L3 Cache Index Disable"-Feature. >>> Xen delegates PCI config space to Dom0 and >>> via PCI passthrough partly to DomU. >>> That means, if registers in PCI config space are independently >>> accessable by Xen, Dom0 and/or DomU, they can interfere with each other. >>> Therefore, we need to a) clearly define who handles what and >>> b) define some rules based on a) >>> c) discuss how to handle Dom0/DomU going wild >>> and break the rules defined in b) >> >> I also agree on the approach in principle, but would like to see these >> points addressed. For non-contiguous pages, I suppose Xen >> could deliver >> multiple #vMCEs to the guest, split into contiguous parts. The >> vmce code >> seems to be set up to be able to do this. > > For the contigous pages, I agree with Gavin that such > contiguous page error should be triggered as multiple #MC and so is ok. > > For PCI config space issue, Christoph, can you please share > more information on it (or provide some document as Frank > suggested), like is it for CE (Correctable error or > UC(UnCorrectable error), is it in PCI range or PCI-E range > (i.e. through 0xCF8/CFC or through MMCONFIG), how the device's > BDF caculated etc. Followed is some of my understanding. > > Firstly, if it is CE, Xen will do nothing and dom0 will take > recovery action. If it is UC, Xen will take action when all > CPU is in SoftIRQ context, and dom0 will not take action, so > it should be ok. > > Secondly, in Xen environment, per my understanding, CPU is > owned by Xen HV, so I'm not sure when dom0 disable L3 cache > (if it is CE), should Xen be aware or not. That is, should > dom0 disable the cache directly, or it should user hypercall > to ask Xen do that. Keir can give us more suggestion. > > For item C, currently Xen/dom0 can both access configuration > space, while domU will do that through PCI_frontend/backend. > Because PCI backend only cover device assigned to domU, so we > don't need worry about domU and dom0 should be trusted. > However, one thing left is, if this range is beyond 0x100 > (i.e. in pci-e range), we need add mmconfig support in Xen, > although it can be added simply. > > Thanks > -- Yunhong Jiang > >> >> As for the Shanghai feature: Christoph, are there any documents >> available on that feature? What kind of errors are delivered >> (corrected/correctable)? >> >> - Frank _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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