[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC 0/5] Grant table for console, xenstore pages
On Mon, Jul 14, 2008 at 3:37 PM, Diego Ongaro <diego.ongaro@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Derek Murray wrote: >> I imagine you've already ready seen this, but the thread beginning >> here has some historical context: >> >> http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xense-devel/2007-05/msg00004.html > > No, I didn't know about that thread. It's disappointing to see that I've > duplicated your efforts in patches 1-3 of my series. On the contrary, I think this is a much nicer approach - especially as it doesn't require any modifications to the hypervisor. Therefore I think it will be a better fit for the mainline repository. > Did you ever finish polishing those patches? Based on the discussion, > there were just a couple things left to clean up. If I remember correctly, I did do some more work on those patches to make the use of gntdev optional, but I don't think they were ready for prime-time. I'll look them out and send them to you off list, in case they might be of any use. >>> I'm working on moving xenstored into a dedicated, unprivileged domain. > > Have you also worked on this, Derek? I wouldn't want to keep working on > something you've already done... I haven't worked on this myself, but I vaguely recall hearing of efforts to disaggregate XenStore - I don't think any of these are publicly available. Is the main aim of this work to enhance security or performance? If the former, how do you plan to launch the XenStore domain? From Dom0, or using another mechanism? My personal inclination is to enhance Xen so that the tools no longer run as root (a conventional Unix-based privilege separation), which provides a low-cost improvement in Dom0 security. This would build on your patches to use gntdev for console and XenStore access, and use modifications to gntdev that allow non-root users to map certain explicitly-specified grants. This would provide a route to disaggregating all necessarily-trusted functionality on systems that would benefit from it (i.e. IOMMU-equipped systems). If you'd like, we could discuss this approach further. Regards, Derek Murray. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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