[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] xsm_op() polymorphism
On Mon, Dec 10, 2007 at 07:05:03PM -0500, George S. Coker, II wrote: > > If I'm reading the code right, then the xsm_op() hypercall is "untyped" > > in the sense that you have to know why XSM is loaded before you can > > interpret any of the contents (that is, the first argument points > > directly to a flask op or acm op structure). This seems less than ideal > > - can't we work out a way to make the struct self-identifying? > > > > It depends on what you are concerned about. There are the magic > numbers that are used right now to identify policy modules on boot but > could become embedded as the first word of the xsm op structure. This > would help the hypervisor be consistent with user-space - if that's > what you are concerned about. It was not the intent to make the > hypervisor runtime agile wrt a given security module except to not > prevent a security module from runtime disablement - for obvious > reasons more flexibility here is fraught with consistency problems. My immediate concern is that we have to do some snooping into hypercalls on Solaris (for reasons not of much interest) - and we can't actually know what structure is being passed in without magically guessing what type of structure it is. But more generally it's not a good interface to not only have to assume something incoming is a particular struct, but have no way of checking that (since the 'op' number-space is shared too) If there's already a magic-number allocation for the XSMs then great, it certainly seems like we should use that. regards john _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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