[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] grant table and bogus mfns
On 12/11/07 09:35, "Kieran Mansley" <kmansley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > 1) dom0 does a grant op for a page of I/O memory; at this stage no > different to a normal grant. > 2) grant reference passed (e.g. through xenstore) to domU > 3) domU performs a map operation on that grant > 4) hypervisor notices that the grant is for an I/O memory page and > instead of mapping it to a domU virtual address it instead sets up the > I/O mem permissions for that domain to access the region (ie. calls > iomem_permit_access()) > 5) domU can then call ioremap() to get a kernel virtual address for the > I/O memory region, and access it as normal. I didn't realise this was how it worked. I think it's a bad idea -- mapping the grantref should map the I/O page. The mapping domain's io capabilities should not be affected. Apart from being the obvious semantics for map_grant, using the current scheme we cannot be sure when all mappings to the granted page have gone away. -- Keir _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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