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[Xen-devel] Re: [Xen-staging] [xen-unstable] Xen Security Modules: XSM



On Tue, 2007-09-04 at 08:07 -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
> On Fri, 2007-08-31 at 11:22 +0100, Xen staging patchbot-unstable wrote:
> > diff -r 0f196e11a143 -r 96f64f4c42f0 xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
> > --- /dev/null   Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
> > +++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h     Fri Aug 31 11:21:35 2007 +0100
> ...
> > +    int (*update_va_mapping) (struct domain *d, l1_pgentry_t pte);
> ...
> > +static inline int xsm_update_va_mapping(struct domain *d,
> > l1_pgentry_t pte)
> > +{
> > +    return xsm_call(update_va_mapping(d, pte));
> > +}
> 
>    Shouldn't we be using a more opaque type here?  l1_pgentry_t is
> rather arch specific.  The implementation of update_va_mapping() in
> flask is also very x86 centric.  Thanks,
> 

For the moment, I would say no since this hook is in the
do_update_va_mapping hypercall which currently exists only in the x86
bits of xen.  The flask module and XSM code are also bounded by ifdefs,
so for non-x86 archs it is not included.  Should other archs ever
develop equivalent funcs, I'd be happy to update this hook to a more
generic interface to accommodate these archs and reduce the number of
arch specific hooks.

George

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