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Re: [Xen-devel] RFC: MCA/MCE concept



On Monday 04 June 2007 18:16:56 Gavin Maltby wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 05/30/07 10:10, Christoph Egger wrote:
> > On Wednesday 30 May 2007 10:49:40 Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>>>> "Christoph Egger" <Christoph.Egger@xxxxxxx> 30.05.07 09:45 >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Wednesday 30 May 2007 09:19:12 Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>>>> case I) - Xen reveives a MCE from the CPU
> >>>>>
> >>>>> 1) Xen MCE handler figures out if error is an correctable error (CE)
> >>>>>    or uncorrectable error (UE)
> >>>>> 2a) error == CE:
> >>>>>     Xen notifies Dom0 if Dom0 installed an MCA event handler
> >>>>>     for statistical purpose
>
> [rest cut]
>
> For the hypervisor to dom0 communication that 2a) above refers to I think
> we need to agree on two aspects:  what form the notification event will
> take, and what error telemetry data and additional information will
> be provided by the hypervisor for dom0 to chew on for statistical
> and diagnosis purposes.

Additionally, the hypervisor must be able to notify domU that has
a PV MCA driver.

> For the first I've assumed so far that an event channel notification
> of the MCA event will suffice;  as long as the hypervisor only polls
> for correctable MCA errors at a low-frequency rate (currently 15s interval)
> there is no danger of spamming that single notification. 

Why polling?

> On receipt of the notification the event handler will need to suck
> some event data out of somewhere - uncertain which somewhere would
> be best?
>
> We should standardize both the format and the content of this event
> data.  The following is just to get the conversation started in this
> area.
>
> Content first.  Obviously we need the raw MCA register content -
> MCi_STATUS, MCi_ADDR, MCi_MISC.  We also need know which
> MCA detector bank made the observation, so we need to include
> some indication of which chip (where I use "chip" to coincide
> with "socket"), core on that chip, and MCA bank number
> the telemetry came from.  I think I am correct in saying that
> hyperthreaded CPUs do not have any MCA banks per-thread, but we
> may want to allow for that future possibility (I know, for instance,
> that some SPARC cpus have error state for each hardware thread).

And we need the domain and the domain's vcpu to identify
who is impacted.

> We should also allow for additional model-specific error telemetry
> that may be available and relevant - I know that will be necessary
> for some upcoming x86 cpu models.  We should probably avoid adding
> "cooked" content to this error event payload - such cooking of the
> raw data is much more easily performed in dom0 (the example I'm
> thinking of here is physical address to memory location translation).
>
> In terms of the form of the error event data, the simplest but also
> the dumbest would be a binary structure passed from hypervisor
> to dom0:
>
struct mca_error_data_ver1 {
        uint8_t version;        /* structure version */
        uint64_t mc_status;
        uint64_t mc_addr;
        uint64_t mc_misc;
        uint16_t mc_chip;
        uint16_t mc_core;
        uint16_t mc_bank;
        uint16_t domid;
        uint16_t vcpu_id;
        ...
};

> That is easily passed around and can be extended by versioning.
> A more self-describing and naturally extensible approach would be
> to parcel the error data in some form of name-type-value list.
> That's what we do in the corresponding kernel->userland error
> code in Solaris; the downside is that the supporting libnvpair
> library is not tiny and likely not the sort of footprint to
> include in a hypervisor.  Perhaps some cut-down form would do.

In the public xen.h header is a VIRQ_DOM_EXC defined, which seems
to be appropriate for an NMI event.
There are two functions to send VIRQs: send_guest_vcpu_virq() and 
send_guest_global_virq().

However, VIRQ_DOM_EXC is not properly implemented:
All virtual interrupts are maskable. We definitely need
an event that guarantees to immediately interrupts the guest, no matter
if this is Dom0 or DomU and whatever they are doing.

And VIRQ_DOM_EXC is explicitely reserved for Dom0. Maybe
we should introduce a VIRQ_MCA as a special NMI event for both Dom0 and DomU?

Christoph


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Operating System Research Center

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