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Re: Fw: [Xen-devel] Xen on /. again



Trent Jaeger wrote:

- isolation boundaries cost more than you might think, but computers are a lot faster now (10X+) - we need mandatory access control interface like LSM to have flexible control of resources (rather than dump resources to a control partition) - authorize access at bind time rather than at use time (no critical path impact)

Is there any reason to allow communication between VMs, other than driver access? It seems to me you can just use network communication (potentially signed or encrypted) when you need to communicate, and that anything else would violate the fundamental 'virtual machine' abstraction?

Also, I suppose you will wish to prevent covert channels between domains, e.g. domains communicating using various timing attacks (I move the disk head to the other end of the disk if I wish to tell you something), or by allocating/freeing certains parts of memory.

How much will you need to dumb down the VMs view of what is going on in the machine to achieve this (not expose real time information, not expose real page tables), and how much of a VMM will there be left when you are done?

best regards,
Jacob


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