|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging] x86emul: introduce a struct cpu_policy * local in x86_emulate()
commit b20e3fbc3ec91b4534e51f6f724c3826dac0bdf3
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed Sep 4 16:06:42 2024 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Wed Sep 4 16:06:42 2024 +0200
x86emul: introduce a struct cpu_policy * local in x86_emulate()
While of little effect right here, future patches (AVX10, AMX,
KeyLocker) will benefit more significantly.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
index 0a6d5a35b1..53742b4796 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
@@ -1233,6 +1233,7 @@ x86_emulate(
{
/* Shadow copy of register state. Committed on successful emulation. */
struct cpu_user_regs _regs = *ctxt->regs;
+ const struct cpu_policy *cp = ctxt->cpu_policy;
struct x86_emulate_state state;
int rc;
uint8_t b, d, *opc = NULL;
@@ -3075,7 +3076,7 @@ x86_emulate(
* in fact risking to make guest OSes vulnerable to the equivalent of
* XSA-7 (CVE-2012-0217).
*/
- generate_exception_if(ctxt->cpuid->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+ generate_exception_if(cp->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
op_bytes == 8 &&
!is_canonical_address(_regs.rcx),
X86_EXC_GP, 0);
#endif
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |