[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen master] x86/IOMMU: move tracking in iommu_identity_mapping()
commit beadd68b5490ada053d72f8a9ce6fd696d626596 Author: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Tue Aug 13 16:36:40 2024 +0200 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue Aug 13 16:36:40 2024 +0200 x86/IOMMU: move tracking in iommu_identity_mapping() If for some reason xmalloc() fails after having mapped the reserved regions, an error is reported, but the regions remain mapped in the P2M. Similarly if an error occurs during set_identity_p2m_entry() (except on the first call), the partial mappings of the region would be retained without being tracked anywhere, and hence without there being a way to remove them again from the domain's P2M. Move the setting up of the list entry ahead of trying to map the region. In cases other than the first mapping failing, keep record of the full region, such that a subsequent unmapping request can be properly torn down. To compensate for the potentially excess unmapping requests, don't log a warning from p2m_remove_identity_entry() when there really was nothing mapped at a given GFN. This is XSA-460 / CVE-2024-31145. Fixes: 2201b67b9128 ("VT-d: improve RMRR region handling") Fixes: c0e19d7c6c42 ("IOMMU: generalize VT-d's tracking of mapped RMRR regions") Signed-off-by: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 8 +++++--- xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c index e7e327d6a6..1739133fc2 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c @@ -1267,9 +1267,11 @@ int p2m_remove_identity_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn_l) else { gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, 0); - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING - "non-identity map d%d:%lx not cleared (mapped to %lx)\n", - d->domain_id, gfn_l, mfn_x(mfn)); + if ( (p2mt != p2m_invalid && p2mt != p2m_mmio_dm) || + a != p2m_access_n || !mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN) ) + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING + "non-identity map %pd:%lx not cleared (mapped to %lx)\n", + d, gfn_l, mfn_x(mfn)); ret = 0; } diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c index cc0062b027..8b1e0596b8 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c @@ -267,24 +267,36 @@ int iommu_identity_mapping(struct domain *d, p2m_access_t p2ma, if ( p2ma == p2m_access_x ) return -ENOENT; - while ( base_pfn < end_pfn ) - { - int err = set_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn, p2ma, flag); - - if ( err ) - return err; - base_pfn++; - } - map = xmalloc(struct identity_map); if ( !map ) return -ENOMEM; + map->base = base; map->end = end; map->access = p2ma; map->count = 1; + + /* + * Insert into list ahead of mapping, so the range can be found when + * trying to clean up. + */ list_add_tail(&map->list, &hd->arch.identity_maps); + for ( ; base_pfn < end_pfn; ++base_pfn ) + { + int err = set_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn, p2ma, flag); + + if ( !err ) + continue; + + if ( (map->base >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K) == base_pfn ) + { + list_del(&map->list); + xfree(map); + } + return err; + } + return 0; } -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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