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[xen staging] x86: detect PIT aliasing on ports other than 0x4[0-3]



commit 2c15fa332efaeb79e602f6ef22672f790b8bebf2
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Thu May 23 10:16:52 2024 +0200
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Thu May 23 10:16:52 2024 +0200

    x86: detect PIT aliasing on ports other than 0x4[0-3]
    
    ... in order to also deny Dom0 access through the alias ports (commonly
    observed on Intel chipsets). Without this it is only giving the
    impression of denying access to PIT. Unlike for CMOS/RTC, do detection
    pretty early, to avoid disturbing normal operation later on (even if
    typically we won't use much of the PIT).
    
    Like for CMOS/RTC a fundamental assumption of the probing is that reads
    from the probed alias port won't have side effects (beyond such that PIT
    reads have anyway) in case it does not alias the PIT's.
    
    As to the port 0x61 accesses: Unlike other accesses we do, this masks
    off the top four bits (in addition to the bottom two ones), following
    Intel chipset documentation saying that these (read-only) bits should
    only be written with zero.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@xxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c        |  7 +++-
 xen/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/time.c              | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c
index 4288957b2b..8d56705a08 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <asm/p2m.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
+#include <io_ports.h>
 
 struct memsize {
     long nr_pages;
@@ -495,7 +496,11 @@ int __init dom0_setup_permissions(struct domain *d)
     rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x4D0, 0x4D1);
 
     /* Interval Timer (PIT). */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x40, 0x43);
+    for ( offs = 0, i = ISOLATE_LSB(pit_alias_mask) ?: 4;
+          offs <= pit_alias_mask; offs += i )
+        if ( !(offs & ~pit_alias_mask) )
+            rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, PIT_CH0 + offs, PIT_MODE + offs);
+
     /* PIT Channel 2 / PC Speaker Control. */
     rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x61, 0x61);
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
index 471aed92c2..d75589178b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ extern unsigned long highmem_start;
 #endif
 
 extern unsigned int i8259A_alias_mask;
+extern unsigned int pit_alias_mask;
 
 extern int8_t opt_smt;
 extern int8_t opt_probe_port_aliases;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/time.c b/xen/arch/x86/time.c
index 85ec73bd9a..a97d784841 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/time.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/time.c
@@ -427,6 +427,74 @@ static struct platform_timesource __initdata_cf_clobber 
plt_pit =
     .resume = resume_pit,
 };
 
+unsigned int __initdata pit_alias_mask;
+
+static void __init probe_pit_alias(void)
+{
+    unsigned int mask = 0x1c;
+    uint8_t val = 0;
+
+    if ( !opt_probe_port_aliases )
+        return;
+
+    /*
+     * Use channel 2 in mode 0 for probing.  In this mode even a non-initial
+     * count is loaded independent of counting being / becoming enabled.  Thus
+     * we have a 16-bit value fully under our control, to write and then check
+     * whether we can also read it back unaltered.
+     */
+
+    /* Turn off speaker output and disable channel 2 counting. */
+    outb(inb(0x61) & 0x0c, 0x61);
+
+    outb(PIT_TCW_CH(2) | PIT_RW_LSB_MSB | PIT_MODE_EOC | PIT_BINARY,
+         PIT_MODE);
+
+    do {
+        uint8_t val2;
+        unsigned int offs;
+
+        outb(val, PIT_CH2);
+        outb(val ^ 0xff, PIT_CH2);
+
+        /* Wait for the Null Count bit to clear. */
+        do {
+            /* Latch status. */
+            outb(PIT_RDB | PIT_RDB_NO_COUNT | PIT_RDB_CH2, PIT_MODE);
+
+            /* Try to make sure we're actually having a PIT here. */
+            val2 = inb(PIT_CH2);
+            if ( (val2 & ~(PIT_STATUS_OUT_PIN | PIT_STATUS_NULL_COUNT)) !=
+                 (PIT_RW_LSB_MSB | PIT_MODE_EOC | PIT_BINARY) )
+                return;
+        } while ( val2 & PIT_STATUS_NULL_COUNT );
+
+        /*
+         * Try to further make sure we're actually having a PIT here.
+         *
+         * NB: Deliberately |, not ||, as we always want both reads.
+         */
+        val2 = inb(PIT_CH2);
+        if ( (val2 ^ val) | (inb(PIT_CH2) ^ val ^ 0xff) )
+            return;
+
+        for ( offs = ISOLATE_LSB(mask); offs <= mask; offs <<= 1 )
+        {
+            if ( !(mask & offs) )
+                continue;
+            val2 = inb(PIT_CH2 + offs);
+            if ( (val2 ^ val) | (inb(PIT_CH2 + offs) ^ val ^ 0xff) )
+                mask &= ~offs;
+        }
+    } while ( mask && (val += 0x0b) );  /* Arbitrary uneven number. */
+
+    if ( mask )
+    {
+        dprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "PIT aliasing mask: %02x\n", mask);
+        pit_alias_mask = mask;
+    }
+}
+
 /************************************************************
  * PLATFORM TIMER 2: HIGH PRECISION EVENT TIMER (HPET)
  */
@@ -2416,6 +2484,8 @@ void __init early_time_init(void)
     }
 
     preinit_pit();
+    probe_pit_alias();
+
     tmp = init_platform_timer();
     plt_tsc.frequency = tmp;
 
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging



 


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