[xen master] x86/livepatch: Make livepatching compatible with CET Shadow Stacks

[patchbot@xxxxxxx]

commit 92167e9430c010df410336f2b68cc4e30b7872d9
Author:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon Jun 8 18:47:58 2020 +0100
Commit:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri Jun 26 16:34:02 2020 +0100

    x86/livepatch: Make livepatching compatible with CET Shadow Stacks
    
    Just like the alternatives infrastructure, the livepatch infrastructure
    disables CR0.WP to perform patching, which is not permitted with CET active.
    
    Modify arch_livepatch_{quiesce,revive}() to disable CET before disabling WP,
    and reset the dirty bits on all virtual regions before re-enabling CET.
    
    One complication is that arch_livepatch_revive() has to fix up the top of 
the
    shadow stack.  This depends on the functions not being inlined, even under
    LTO.  Another limitation is that reset_virtual_region_perms() may shatter 
the
    final superpage of .text depending on alignment.
    
    This logic, and its downsides, are temporary until the patching 
infrastructure
    can be adjusted to not use CR0.WP.
    
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/livepatch.c         | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 xen/common/virtual_region.c      | 15 +++++++++++++++
 xen/include/xen/virtual_region.h |  1 +
 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/livepatch.c b/xen/arch/x86/livepatch.c
index 901fad96bf..49f0d902e5 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/livepatch.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/livepatch.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <xen/livepatch.h>
 #include <xen/sched.h>
 #include <xen/vm_event.h>
+#include <xen/virtual_region.h>
 
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
 #include <asm/nmi.h>
@@ -56,18 +57,48 @@ int arch_livepatch_safety_check(void)
     return -EBUSY;
 }
 
-int arch_livepatch_quiesce(void)
+int noinline arch_livepatch_quiesce(void)
 {
+    /* If Shadow Stacks are in use, disable CR4.CET so we can modify CR0.WP. */
+    if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk )
+        write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_CET);
+
     /* Disable WP to allow changes to read-only pages. */
     write_cr0(read_cr0() & ~X86_CR0_WP);
 
     return 0;
 }
 
-void arch_livepatch_revive(void)
+void noinline arch_livepatch_revive(void)
 {
     /* Reinstate WP. */
     write_cr0(read_cr0() | X86_CR0_WP);
+
+    /* Clobber dirty bits and reinstate CET, if applicable. */
+    if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) && cpu_has_xen_shstk )
+    {
+        unsigned long tmp;
+
+        reset_virtual_region_perms();
+
+        write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_CET);
+
+        /*
+         * Fix up the return address on the shadow stack, which currently
+         * points at arch_livepatch_quiesce()'s caller.
+         *
+         * Note: this is somewhat fragile, and depends on both
+         * arch_livepatch_{quiesce,revive}() being called from the same
+         * function, which is currently the case.
+         *
+         * Any error will result in Xen dying with #CP, and its too late to
+         * recover in any way.
+         */
+        asm volatile ("rdsspq %[ssp];"
+                      "wrssq %[addr], (%[ssp]);"
+                      : [ssp] "=&r" (tmp)
+                      : [addr] "r" (__builtin_return_address(0)));
+    }
 }
 
 int arch_livepatch_verify_func(const struct livepatch_func *func)
diff --git a/xen/common/virtual_region.c b/xen/common/virtual_region.c
index aa23918bce..4fbc02e35a 100644
--- a/xen/common/virtual_region.c
+++ b/xen/common/virtual_region.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <xen/init.h>
 #include <xen/kernel.h>
+#include <xen/mm.h>
 #include <xen/rcupdate.h>
 #include <xen/spinlock.h>
 #include <xen/virtual_region.h>
@@ -91,6 +92,20 @@ void unregister_virtual_region(struct virtual_region *r)
     remove_virtual_region(r);
 }
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_LIVEPATCH) && defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK)
+void reset_virtual_region_perms(void)
+{
+    const struct virtual_region *region;
+
+    rcu_read_lock(&rcu_virtual_region_lock);
+    list_for_each_entry_rcu( region, &virtual_region_list, list )
+        modify_xen_mappings((unsigned long)region->start,
+                            ROUNDUP((unsigned long)region->end, PAGE_SIZE),
+                            PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RX);
+    rcu_read_unlock(&rcu_virtual_region_lock);
+}
+#endif
+
 void __init unregister_init_virtual_region(void)
 {
     BUG_ON(system_state != SYS_STATE_active);
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/virtual_region.h b/xen/include/xen/virtual_region.h
index e5e58ed96b..ba408eb87a 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/virtual_region.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/virtual_region.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ void setup_virtual_regions(const struct exception_table_entry 
*start,
 void unregister_init_virtual_region(void);
 void register_virtual_region(struct virtual_region *r);
 void unregister_virtual_region(struct virtual_region *r);
+void reset_virtual_region_perms(void);
 
 #endif /* __XEN_VIRTUAL_REGION_H__ */
 
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master